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ABSTRACT 
The locus of the Attentional Blink (AB) was investigated using AB and Psychological 
Refractory Penod (PRP) experimental paradigms. The first task in the AB experiments (Exps. 
1 and 2) was to identify a target Ietter (Ti), which was an H, O, or S .  presented in an RSVP 
stream of distractor letten. The second task in these experirnents was to identifj a second target 
letter (T?), an X or Y. In Experiment 1, the response to Tl was speeded and in Experiment 2 it 
was unspeeded. T2 always appeared in one of the 8 positions in the RSVP strearn immediately 
following Tl and the response to T2 was never speeded. Accuracy on identifying T2 was 
severely attenuated when Tz followed within approximately 500 ms after Tl. in the PRP 
experirnents (Exps. 3 and 4), the first task was to judge whether an auditory tone (Si) was 
low, medium, or high in pitch. Following the tone, at variable stimulus-onset asynchrony 
(SOA). a target letter (S2)  was presented and the second task was to identify the target letter, 
which could be an H. O. or an S. In these experiments both responses were speeded. Mean 
response time to S2 slowed as SOA decreased. 
The probability of the target letter, Tl in the AB experiments. and S2 in the PRP 
experiments. was manipulated so that one letter was assigned a relative frequency value of 1, 
another a value of 4, and another a value of 9. In the AB experiments the least frequently 
presented target letter produced a larger AB effect than the target letter assigned to the 
intemediate frequency condition, which in turn produced a larger effect than the most 
frequently presented target letter. These results indicate that the locus of signal probability is at, 
or before, the locus of the AB effect. In the PRP experiments, signal probability was additive 
with SOA. According to the locus of cognitive slack logic (Pashler & Johnson, 1984), additive 
effects indicate that the locus of probability is at, or beyond the locus of the PRP bottieneck. 
These resuits lead to the conclusion that a locus of the AB effect is at, or after, the PRP 
bottieneck. It is generally believed that the PRP bottleneck is located at a late stage of 
information processing, such as response selection. Thus, these results suggest that the AB 
effect also has its locus at a late stage of processing, possibly at, or after, the stage where 
responses are selected. 
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When stimuli are presented in rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) it is usual to 
observe an interference effect between sequential items. Raymond, Shapiro, and Arne11 ( 1992) 
reported such an effect in an RSVP strearn where target letten were embedded among 
distractor letters. A relationship was observed between correct identification of a second target 
(Tz) and its temporal proximity to a preceding target (Tl). The proportion of correct 
identifications of T? decreased as the nurnber of items between Tl decreased except when 
there were no intervening items (when Tz appeared immediately after Tl). This attenuation in 
performance on accurately identifying T2 when it appean within approximately 100 to 500 ms 
following Tl has been termed the Attentional Blink (AB) by Raymond et al. (1992). 
Evidence suggests that interference effects like the AB are a result of attentional 
limitations in our ability to process information (Chun & Potter, 1995; Jolicoeur, 1998a; Luck, 
Vogel, & Shapiro, 1996; Raymond et al.. 1992). However, our understanding of the nature of 
these limitations is incomplete. For example, at what processing stage(s) dws interference 
occur, and what are the stimulus factors that modify the size of the effect? 
The aim of this thesis is to understand more fully the characteristics of the AB 
phenomenon with specific focus on leaming more about the locus, or loci, of this interference 
effect. Where, within the series of processing stages necessary to perform a first task, does 
intederence on a szcond tiisk occur? 
The Attentional Blink 
In one of the original studies designed to investigate the AB phenomenon, Raymond et 
al. (Exp. 2, 1992) used an RSVP stream of black uppercase letters presented on a grey 
background at a rate of 1 1 itemdsec. A white target letter (Tl) was presented within the stream. 
Tt was always preceded by seven to fifieen distractor Ietters and was followed by eight letters. 
On half the triais a probe letter (Tz), a black X, appeared in any one of the eight positions 
immediately following the target. These eight positions. subsequentiy referred to as TpT2 lags 
1 though 8, denote the positions that followed Tl in which T2 could appear. T2 never appemd 
in any other position within the strearn. 
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In the expenmental condition the first task was to identify Tl and the second task was 
to report whether T2 had been present or absent. In the control condition. only the second task 
was performed and T 1 could be ignored. 
Accuracy on judging whether T2 had been present or absent dropped to below 60% 
when T2 appeared nt T 1 -T2 lags 2 - 5 following T 1, compared to about 90% correct, across al1 
T I - T ~  lags, in the control condition (Tl was ignored). 
The results show the effect is the outcome of processing necessary for Tl that interferes 
with processing a second item (T?), when the second item follows the first within a certain time 
frarne (- 100 - 500 ms). It was this defici t in processing Tz, at short T 1-T2 lags, that Raymond 
et al. (1992) termed the AB. The results also suggest that the AB effect is not the consequence 
of sensory rnasking by Tl, because both expenmental and control streams were identical. 
Rather, the effect depends on processing the target in some way. This observation in mm 
suggests that the AB effect is due to attentional limitations in our ability to process information. 
The AB effect is not restricted to letters and has been shown to be generalizable to many 
types of stimuli including colour (Ross & Jolicoeur, 1999), words (Broadbent & Broadbent, 
19871, orientation of T2 (Joseph, Chun & Nakayama 1997). location (Ross & Jolicoeur, in 
press), and when Tl K a s  in the form of a random dot pattern (Shapiro, Raymond & Amell, 
Exp. 4, 1993). 
Neither is it limited to the visuai modality. Though less robust than that found using 
visual stimuli, Arne11 and Jolicoeur ( 1998) reported a significant AB effect using rapid auditory 
presentation (RAP). Interestingly, there was a difference in the presentation rate necessary to 
produce an AB for visual and auditory stimuli in that the auditory stream had to be presented at 
a faster rate than RSVP. Also, w hen Ti modality and T;? modality were crossed (visual- 
auditory; auditory-visuai) an AB was observed for both cross-modal conditions. Jolicoeur 
(1999~) has also reported AB effects under cross-modal conditions using visually presented 
distractor items and an auditory Tl stimulus. In this snidy, Tl was a 100 ms duration auditory 
tone presented concurrentiy with an RSVP strem of lettea, while Tt was a letter wiihin the 
Stream. 
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The finding of a cross-modal AB effect is consistent with the hypothesis that a centrai 
mechanism underlies the effect. If the processing limitations that produce the AB effect are 
modality specific then one would expect, if not an elimination, at least a large reduction in the 
size of the AB for cross-modal Tl - T2 conditions. 
AB effects for auditory and cross-modal presentations are not consistently found 
however. Contrary to the findings of Arnell and Jolicoeur (1998). Potter, Chun, Banks, and 
Muckenhoupt ( 1998) used RAP and found that, although T2 accuracy was poorer in the Tl- 
present condition compared to the control condition (Tl-absent). there was no effect of TpT2 
lag. Typically, AB is observed not only as a decrement in overall performance on detecting or 
identifying T2, but also as a decline in T2 accuracy as a function of the position of T;! in relation 
to Tl. Accuracy on Tz improves as the number of lag positions between Tl and T2 increases. 
In the study conducted by Potter et al. (1998), no such relationship was found. These 
researchers also found no AB effect, that is, no performance decrement and no function of Tl- 
Tz lag for cross-modal presentations. 
The discrepancy between experimental outcomes appears to be a function of the 
modaiity in which the rapid stimulus Stream is presented. The magnitude of the AB effect is 
relatively reliable and stable in the visual realm but effects using RAP are less consistent and 
certainly this discrepancy requires further investigation. Possible explanations for differential 
effects will be discussed more fully in the next section, under the heading Terceptual 
Influences." 
Percepml Influences 
It does not appear that the AB effect is a consequence of processing limitations at an 
early sensory encoding stage. If the effect was due to masking of T2 by Ti, then the same 
effect should be found in the control condition, where Tl was ignored, because the streams 
were identical. Therefore, the AB effect is not simply a form of sensory masking. 
Nevertheless, there are conditions under which perceptual masking appean to be a 
necessary component for producing an AB effect. Giesbrecht and Di Loiio (1999) reported 
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that, when Tz was the last item in an RSVP strearn or when it was followed by non-pattemed 
visual noise, no AB effect was evident. Therefore. the AB effect requires pattern masking Tt. 
The effect of masking TI seems to be more variable. Raymond et al. (1992) found no 
decrement in Tî accuracy when the first (+l) item after Tl was replaced by a blank interval. 
When the +1 item was present and the second item (+2) was replaced by a blank interval the 
AB effect was restored. Seiffert and Di Lollo (1997) also compared conditions where the +l 
item was blank to where it was filled and found a reduced, though significant AB effeci, in the 
blank + 1 item condition. 
Moving the + 1 item 1 degree of visuai angle to the right of the location of Ti (Ti was a 
letter, - 0.820 visual angle) has also been found to reduce the size of the AB, as did increasing 
the featurai distinction between the strearn and the +l item (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 
1995). The latter manipulation was accomplished by insening an array made up of four black 
dots positioned randornly within the area that would typically be occupied by the +l item in an 
RSVP letter Stream, 
Though perceptual masking, of T2 by Tl, cannot account for the AB effect, it does 
appear that, under certain conditions, masking is an important factor controlling the 
manifestation and magnitude of the effect. 
As discussed in the previous section, a larger AB effect has k e n  observed with visual 
(RSVP) than with auditory (RAP) streams (Amell & Jolicoeur, 1998) yet the underlying 
explanation for this differential effect is not clear. Potter et. al. (1998) hypothesize that the 
variation in the effect size is a result of different interference processes, one strictly visual and 
another that is modal. Contrary to the findings of Arne11 and Jolicoeur (1998), Potter et al. 
(Exps. 1 & 2, 1998) initially found a deficit in accuracy on detecting T2 but no effect of Tl-TZ 
position with auditory streams. 
It is important to keep in mind that the SOA for items in the RAP Stream used by Potter 
et al. ( 1998) was always longer than that used by Arnell and Jolicoeur ( 1998). The variations 
observed in the outcome of experiments using RAP could very well be due to this 
methodological difTerence. Stimulus-onset asynchronies of 120 and 135 ms, which were used 
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by Potter et al. (1998). rnay have allowed enough time between RAP items so that processing 
Tl did not interfere with processing Tl. In contrast. the shoner SOA of 93.3 ms used by Amell 
and Jolicoeur ( 1998). rnay have produced the necessary conditions. by reducing the time 
between RAP items, in which processing Tl interfered with processing Tz. We know that 
masking of T2 is a necessary condition for an AB effect to be observed (Giesbrecht & Di Lollo. 
1999). and also that masking of an unspeeded Tl stimulus is a requirement (Raymond et al., 
Exp. 3. 1992). Thus. variations found using RAP rnay be due to differential masking 
conditions. If the rate of presentation of items within a strearn is not sufficient to provide the 
necessary masking conditions it is not surprising to find no AB effect. 
Response Influences 
A partial explanation for the divergent effects observed with perceptual masking may be 
that different or additional processing stages contribute to interference when a response to TI is 
speeded as opposed to when it is unspeeded. If the TI response is not speeded, and is made at 
the end of the stream, masking of Tl seems ta be necessary for an AB effect. In contrast, when 
the response to Ti is speeded, in other words. when it is made as quickly as possible after 
detection. masking does not seem to be a requirement for AB. The difference between masking 
requirements for speeded and unspeeded Ti responses and the differentid effects on the AB is 
perhaps suggestive of the necessity for immediate processing of Tl. Under speeded, and 
unspeeded but masked, Tl conditions, information must be processed immediately and on-line. 
In the former case it is the imrnediacy of the on-line response that forces processing, whereas 
in the latter it is immediacy of processing to a sufficient extent pnor to the onset of the masking 
event (such as the next item in the RSVP stream). In both circurnstances the decline in accuracy 
on T2 identification as a hinction of its temporal proximity to Tl could be a reflection of 
ongoing processing related to the Tl item. Whether both situations reflect interference at the 
same processing stage(s) is arnbiguous at this point. 
In a between subjects experiment, Jolicoeur (Exp. 3, 1999a) compared speeded Tl 
responses to unspeeded responses. A larger AB effect was found for the Tl speeded condition 
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at shorter Tl-T2 lags ( 1 - 4) but at the longer TI-TZ lags the unspeeded condition produced a 
larger AB effect. The interaction between Tl response conditions and Tl-- lag implies that 
different processing mechanisms rnay underlie speeded and unspeeded conditions, which in 
turn suggests that variations in more than one stage of processing may contribute to 
interference producing the AB phenomenon. This line of thinking will be discussed more fully 
later in this thesis. 
Theories of the Attentional Blink Phenornenon 
Atttentional Gate nteory 
The Attentional Gate Theory (Raymond et al., 1992) comprises two stages of 
processing, a preattentive detection stage during which attention is allocated, and an 
identification stage. The mode1 postulates that. as visual information fiows from sensory input 
sites to recognition centers of the brain, an attentional gate is opened if a target-defining feature 
is detected. The gate remains open until processing is complete and identification is achieved. 
Under conditions where the possibility of confusion exists, for example when stimuli are 
presented in rapid succession and the + 1 item enters the buffer dong with Ti, a suppressive 
mechanism is initiated in which the gate closes and is temporarily locked. Subsequent 
attentional allocation to the next episode takes longer to initiate when the gate is "locked" 
compared to when the gate is simply closed. The consequence of this delay is manifest as an 
AB effect. 
Evidence against the Attentional Gate Theory has k e n  provided in AB paradiepu 
where Tl detection, without identification, is sufficient for an AB (Shapiro et al., Exp. 2, 
1994). Reasoning that letters may be identified even involuntarily (when subjects are instructed 
to report the presence but not the identity of Tl), Shapiro et al. (Exp. 4, 1994) obtained an AB 
effect in an experiment where Taski and Task2 were both unspeeded and subjects were fmt to 
detect the presence or absence of a random dot pattern, followed by detection of T2 (an X). The 
results demonstrate that detection of Tl is sufficient to produce an interference effect. More 
recently, the finding of AB effects when Tl and T2 are presented in different modalities (Amell 
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& Jolicoeur, 1998). does not support the Attentional Gate Model of interference. It is unlikely 
that the closing of an attentional gate in one rnodality would have detnmentai effects on 
processing a subsequent target stimulus presented in another modality. AB effects have been 
observed using non-patterned target information (Ross & Jolicoeur. 1999) a finding that is also 
inconsistent with the Attentional Gate Theory . 
Similarity Theop 
Having demonstrated an AB effect for target detection without identification, Shapiro 
and his colleagues (1994) found it necessary to revise the two-stage Attentionai Gate theory. 
Moreover, they had found that the AB was eliminated when Tl was a blank interval instead of 
the usuai letter item and thereby contained no pattemed information (Shapiro et al., Exp. 5A, 
1994). In this experiment subjects were instructed to make a judgment (present or absent) 
pertaining to Tl which was a temporal gap in the RSVP strearn. According to Shapiro et ai. 
( 1994) the observation that no AB existed when Tl was made up of non-pattemed information 
supported the idea that, although detection of Ti without identification would suffice to 
produce an AB effect, the requirement that Tl consist of pattemed information was essential. 
What the researchers failed to note was that under these conditions, where Tl was a temporal 
gap, masking of Tl was also eliminated, a condition that rnay have caused the small observed 
effects in Task2. As already mentioned, AB effects using non-pattemed information (colour, 
location) have since k e n  reported by Ross and Jolicoeur ( 1999). 
According to the Similarity Theory (Shapiro et al., 1994) items in visual short-term 
memory (VSTM) compete for report based on an assigned weighting. In the initial stage of 
processing, structural representations of items in the RSVP strearn are formed. Templates of Tl 
and T2 are compared to these representations and matching items are entered into VSTM where 
they are assigned a weight depending on their sirnilarity to the templates. The similarity of the 
distractor items to Tl and T2, especially those distractors that irnrnediately follow Tl and T2, is 
reflected in the weighting value which not only affects the probability of an item gaining access 
to VSTM but also the likelihood of later report. Distractor items wiil typically be less heavily 
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weighted than target items but the value of the weight assigned to them may be sufficient to 
create some confusion. The AB effect is a result of item confusion at the time of output from 
VSTM. This short-term rnemory bank has limited capacity and items do not remûin indefinitely 
in VSTM. The relative absence of an interference effect when T2 appears at the longer Tl-T2 
lags (> -600 ms) is due to the removal of T 1. possibly through decay, from VSTM. 
The Similarity Theory is limited to the VSTM and does not predict a sirnilar pattern of 
T? interference when stimuli enter auditory short-term memory. Consequently. findings of AB 
effects using auditory stimuli (Arne11 & Jolicoeur. 1998, Iolicoeur, 1999c) do not support the 
Similarity Theory. 
Attentional Dwell Theory 
In contrast to the preceding theories, the Attentional Dwell Theory proposes that the AB 
is caused by how attention is (or is not) deployed rather than by factors like percepnial masking 
(Duncan, Ward, & Shapiro, 1994; Ward, Duncan, & Shapiro, 1996). Ward et al. (1996) 
propose that attention is a sustained state, not a high-speed serial process, and that this state is 
necessary for the creation of object representations, which in turn will guide subsequent 
cognitive processing. Because attention does not proceed in a high-speed serial fashion. al1 
items in the Stream are not attended to equally. Limitations a ise  when items compete for 
capacity-limited processing resources on the bais of their match to a representation of the 
target. Demand increases as the number of items attended increases. 
Support for this theory of attentional limitations cornes from a snidy in which either one 
or two stimuli had to be identified followed, at variable stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA), by a 
second stimulus (Ward et al., Exp. 3, 1996). In this study either one digit was presented, to 
the left or right of fixation. or two digits were presented simuitaneously, one to the left of 
fixation and the other to the right of fixation. Following the digit(s), a letter appemd either 
above or below fixation. SOA was varied, ranging from O to 900 ms. Stimulus exposure was 
determined for each subject during a practice session and ranged between 45 - 75 rns and each 
character was followed by a 250 ms masking pattern. There were four response conditions 
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associated with this experiment and these conditions were blocked within subjecü. When only 
one digit was presented subjects were either to a) ignore the digit and report the letter or b) 
report the digit and the letter. When two digits appeared subjects were to a) ignore both digits 
and report the Ietter or b) report both digits and ais0 the letter. 
The data exhibited a similar pattern of interference as is !ypically found in experiments 
designed to produce AB effects (this study did not employ an RSVP stream). In conditions 
where the fint item, the digit, could be ignored accuracy on reporting the second item, the 
letter, was relatively high (approximately 90%) and was not affected by SOA. When the 
digit(s) had to be reported, in the report one digit condition and in the report two digit 
condition, accuracy on identifying the letter dropped significantly when the letter appeared up 
to 300 ms after the digit(s) after which point performance improved as SOA increased. The 
greatest degree of attenuation in letter identification was found in the report two digits 
condition, which was significantly poorer than when only one digit had to be reported. 
Processing required for stimuli presented simultaneously (two digits) resulted in a greater 
degree of interference on a subsequent stimulus (a letter) than did processing only one initiai 
stimulus (one digit). According to the Attentional Dwell Theory. when two stimuli need to be 
processed concumntly, capacity must be shared resulting in less availability of resources 
necessary for processing a third stimulus. These results suggest that interference is a function 
of the number of items to be attended, not the number of items to be ignored, and the temporal 
proximity of those items (Ward et al., 1996). 
However, in an RSVP paradigrn, Seiffert and Di Lollo (1997) did not find a difference 
in accuracy for detecting a second item as a function of identifying one or more previously 
presented items. Subjects were required to identify one, or two simultaneously presented, Tl 
items and Say whether a Tt item. that followed at variable TpT2 lags, was present or absent. In 
the one-TI condition two letters were presented beside each other (one of the letters was in the 
sarne location as the rest of the RSVP Stream and the other was directly to the nght). The letters 
differed in brightness and the brighter of the two letters was Tl which was the letter to be 
reported. In the two-Ti condition both letters were of equal luminance and both were to be 
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reported. No significant difference was found between the two conditions. In this experiment 
the + I  position was blank and accuracy for Tz was poorest when it appeared in the second 
position (+2) following TI. Performance thereafter improved steadily as a fùnction of 
increasing Tl-Tz lag. The lack of T l  masking due to the omission of the +1 item in this 
experiment may have allowed two Ti stimuli (in the two Tl condition) to be processed to an 
equivalent degree, thus producing comparable effects in the one, and two, Tl conditions. 
Two-Stage Theoty 
A Two-Stage Theory of interference within the AB paradigm has k e n  proposed by 
Chun and Potter (1995). In this theory al1 items within the RSVP Stream are initially processed 
to a degree that allows them to be detected and identified briefly. Representations decay rapidly 
if rhey are not selected for further processing due to interference from other items. A second 
stage of processing is capacity limited and entails consolidating this early fom of processed 
information to a more stable fom, perhaps verbal short-term memory (STM). The Two-Stage 
Theory assens that the consolidation process necessary for one item has to be complete before 
the sarne process necessary to consolidate another item cm begin. For example, processing 
necessary for Tl must be finished before processing of T2 can proceed. If processing of T2 has 
to be delayed, or postponed, the outcome is that information will be subject to rapid-forgetting 
resulting in dificulty in correctly reporting the identity of T2. 
In contrast to the Attentionai Gate and the Sirnilarity theories, Chun and Potter (1995) 
hypothesize that visually patterned information is not a necessary requirement for observing an 
AB. They propose however, that an AB effect is more likely to be found with visual than with 
auditory input and they suggest that one reason rnight be because VSTM has a more lirnited 
capacity and representations are stable for a shorter period of time than auditory STM, thereby 
providing greater opportunity for confusion or decay of items. This hypothesis cm provide the 
bais for an explanation of the finding that the magnitude of the AB effect observed using 
auditory stimuli is sometimes smalIer than that found for visuai stimuli. 
Central Interference Theon, 
The Central Interference Theory (Jolicoeur, 1999a) outlines an information processing 
model and suggests how the processing stages contained within the model are affected by 
interference. Moreover, the theory offers an account of the relationship between processing 
stages. capacity limitations. and performance. 
The two earliest stages in the Central Interference Theory resernble the first stage of 
Chun and Potter's Two-Stage Theory (Chun & Potter, 1995). Stage one is a sensory encoding 
stage that is a relatively capacity-free sensory store of representations that have not yet k e n  
categorized. These low-level representations are susceptible to masking by other sensory 
events. Perceptual encoding foilows. This stage produces post-categorical representations that 
are immune to masking. This stage is also capacity-free and, because representations here 
contain identity information, it is at this stage that items are selected for further processing. If 
not processed funher the representations rapidly decay. 
Although these early encoding stages process information to the level of identity, the 
form of the representation at this point is not adequate to serve as the basis for a response. 
According to the Centrai Interference Theory, in order for a response to be made information 
must be converted to a more stable form suitable for further processing (Duncan, 1980). 
In the ensuing stage, selective control, representations produced by perceptual encoding 
are matched against selection cnteria, such as colour and size as weil as those critena that 
distinguish mernbers of a category (e.g., letters from digits; 'H' from 'S'). When a response is 
not imrnediately required (unspeeded Tl response), a fourth stage, short-term consolidation, is 
required. Only items that have been selected for further processing advance to short-term 
consolidation and, subsequently, to a more durable form of storage in memory, called durable 
storage (Coltheart, 1980). which is likely akin to short-terni memory (STM). Consolidation 
takes time and the duration of the process is dependent on the amount of information to be 
consolidated (Jolicoeur & DellTAcqua, 1998). Information stored at the durable storage stage is 
stable for a relatively long period of time and is sufficiently processed so that a response can be 
made. When a response is required immediately upon detecting a stimulus within a trial, 
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transfer of the information to durable storage is not necessary and a response cm be initiated at 
a separate response selection stage. The stages of short-term consolidation and response 
selection rnutually interfere with each other so that when TI is speeded, short-tenn 
consolidation of Tz is postponed due to response selection of T 1 .  When T 1 is unspeeded, the 
short-term consolidation of Ta is delayed until short-terni consolidation of Tl is complete. The 
different processing stages engaged in speeded and unspeeded Tl responding might be related 
to the differential effects of masking noted earlier. If Tl is not masked and an unspeeded 
response is required a reduced AB is observed (Raymond et al., 1992; Seiffert & Di Lollo. 
1997). But, when a speeded, on-line, response is made, masking does not seem to be a 
necessary requisite for the manifestation of an AB effect. The common factor seems to be that 
under both conditions a fom of immediate. on-line processing is required and, though 
processing may conceivably have different predominant goals, it is the immediacy of 
processing. plus the capacity demands of that processing, that cause interference in subsequent 
processing and result in an AB effect. 
Jolicoeur ( 1999b) proposed a general mode1 of the AB effect, based on the Central 
Interference Theory, to explain the finding that an effect of increasing the number of stimulus- 
response alternatives was only evident when the response to Tl was speeded. According to his 
account, when the response to Ti is speeded, storage of a representation of Ti in STM is not 
needed because the response occurs on-Iine and T 1 must be processed immediately. Response 
selection therefore takes place prior to the short-term consolidation of T2. When the number of 
stimulus-response alternatives in Taski is increased. for exarnple from two-alternative 
discrimination response to four-alternative discrimination response, the duration of the 
response selection stage is increased and the short-term consolidation of T2 is postponed 
accordingly. The consequence of this sequence of events is a reduction in accuracy in Task2. 
When the response to Tl cm wait until the end of the triai, the short-term consolidation of Tl 
must occur so that a representation cm be held in memory until a response is made. Thus, 
when Taski is unspeeded, short-term consolidation of Tl and T2 will both take place pnor to 
response selechon. Because response selection for Taski will occur after short-term 
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consolidation of T?, the process of response selection will not affect Taskz performance, when 
the response to TI is delayed until the end of the trial. 
However. AB effects are seen when responses to Tl  are unspeeded (Jolicoeur. 1999a; 
Raymond et al.. 1992; Raymond et al., 1994; Seiffert & Di Lollo. 1997. Shapiro et al.. 1994). 
Jolicoeur ( 1999a) proposes that. under these conditions. the process of consolidating Tl for 
entry in to STM interferes with the same process associated with T2. Hence, when the Tl 
response is unspeeded. and short-tem consolidation of Tl is necessary, short-term 
consolidation of T2 is postponed until processing for Ti is complete (Chun & Potter, 1995). 
When Tl  is speeded the process of consolidating Ti does not occur, but response selection 
associated with Ti causes the short-tem consolidation of T2 to be postponed. In either case, 
the delay of short-term consolidation of T2 results in a decline in accuracy on detection andor 
identification of T2, possibly because of decay of the T2 representation prior to the initiation of 
the processing necessary for entry in to STM. 
Evidence, consisent with the account of interference proposed by the Central 
Interference Theory, shows thai the process of consolidating Tl is not exclusive to interfenng 
with short-tenn consolidation of T2, but can also postpone the process of response selection of 
T2 (Jolicoeur & Dell'Acqua, 1998). When response to a first stimulus is unspeeded, to be 
made at the end of a trial, short-terni consolidation of that stimulus is necessary. When the 
response to a second stimulus is speeded, the process of response selection for that stimulus is 
required. Thus, according to the Central Interference Theory, when an unspeeded task 
precedes a speeded task the process of short-term consolidation should postpone response 
selection of the second stimulus when SOA is short. Such was the case observed in an 
experiment in which the firsr task was to remeniber items (1 - 3 letters) to be reported at the end 
of the aial, and the second task was a two-alternative discrimination speeded response to an 
auditory tone (Jolicoeur & Dell' Acqua, 1998). In addition to an effect of SOA, an effect of the 
number of items to be remembered affected response time (RT) to the tone. Response tirne to 
the tone increased as SOA decreased. and as the nurnber of items to be remembered increased. 
When no items were to be recalled there was no such effect on tone RT. Jolicoeur and 
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Dell' Acqua ( 1998) interpreted the results as evidence that the process of short-term 
consolidation necessary for the first stimulus postponed the process of response selection of 
the second stimulus. 
Psychological Refractory Period 
One form of dual-task interference that may be related to the AB effect is the 
Psychological Refractory Period (PRP) effect. In a typical PRP design two stimuli are 
presented with no intervening filler items. SOA is varied and a speeded response is required to 
both stimuli. The PRP effect is observed as a slowing in performance on a second task (Task2) 
as a function of its temporal proximity to a first task (Taski). Response times to Taskz are 
typicdly delayed when the stimuli are presented at shorter SOAs compared to when they are 
presented at Ionger SOAs (Pashler, 1994b; Welford, 1952). 
Found even using very simple tasks, such as detection, the PRP effect is a robust 
interference effect that appears to be relatively resistant to practice (Gottsdanker & Stelmach, 
197 1;  McCann & Johnston. 1992; Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1997). It has been observed using 
visual stimuli (Luck, 1998; Pashler, 1994a), as well as under cross-modal conditions (McCann 
& Johnston, 1992; Pashler, 1994b; Van Selst & Jolicoeur. 1997). Moreover, output modality 
does not need to be the same for each task. Pashler (1989, 1990) observed PRP effects when 
manuai and vocal responses were combined. 
rheories of the Psychological Refractory Period Phenornenon 
Cclpaciîy Theory 
In an endeavor to undentand the PRP effect. theorists have pursued two distinct paths 
- the capacity and postponement theories. Capacity theories propose that PRP is a reflection of 
limitations in available resources needed to process information (Kahneman, 1973; McLeod, 
1977). When two stimuli appear in close succession to each other they may require the sarne 
processing resources. Because processing of the stimuli occurs in parallel these processors 
rnust be shared and the effect of this division is seen as a slowing in response times. The closer 
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in time the stimuli are to each other the more resources must be shared and the greater the 
slowing. Some researchers suggest that a single mental resource is responsible for the capacity 
limitations (Kahneman. 1973) while others favour a multiple resource view (Wickens, 1980). 
Evidence against this theory lies in the fact that, if capacity is allocated equdly between 
tasks, as might be expected when a response is required to more than one stimulus, reaction 
time to the first and second stimuli should show equivalent effects of SOA, slowing as SOA 
decreases and greater demand is placed on resource sharing. Rarely is this the case. 
Most studies investigating the hindmental mechanism underiying the PRP instruct 
subjects to respond as fast as they can to the stimuli. If individuais are able to divide available 
resources unequally between tasks. so that more capacity is given to the first task than the 
second, they may do so in an effort to respond to the first task as quickly as possible. In such a 
case, bottleneck-like effects would be observed (i.e. effects of SOA on Taskz but not Taski), 
even though shared resources is the limiting factors underlying the PRP effect. However, 
when subjects are specifically instructed to place equal emphasis on each response they appear 
to be unable to do so. Instead, they typicaily show a bimodal distribution of RTi and RT2 in 
that long RTls correlate with long RTzs, and short RTls correlate highly with short RT2s 
(Pashler, 1994~). This pattern of results reveals that subjects have dificulty dividing resources 
based on instructions. and sheds doubt on the interpretation that they do so when instructed to 
make speeded responses to consecutive tasks. 
Manipulating Task2 difficulty and SOA yields specific predictions for a limited resource 
account of interference. If Task2 difficulty is varied so that there is more than one level, the 
effect of this manipulation should increase in magnitude as SOA decreases (McCann & 
Johnston, 1992). As SOA decreases and task overlap increases more demand is placed on 
shared resources and a larger effect of Task;? difficulty should be observed than is seen at 
longer SOAs. Typicaily, the magnitude of the effect of Task;! difficulty either remains constant 
across SOAs or increases as SOA increases thereby weakening the idea that we are dealing 
with a capacity-sharing model (McCann & Johnston, 1992; Pashler & Johnston, 1989). 
Postponernent Theory 
An altemate, and generally more widely accepted theory of dual-task interference, is a 
postponement theory, which postulates a delay of processing rather than sharing of resources 
(Pashler. 1994b; Welford, 1952). A primary assumption of a postponement account of 
interference is that, if resources necessary for one task are common to both tasks. processing 
will not proceed in a concurrent fashion. Processing of Task2 will be forced to wait until 
resources used for Taski become available. It is this 'wait' period that is reflected in the 
slowing of reaction time to the second task as SOA is reduced. 
Some evidence for an information processing bottleneck underlying dual-task 
interference lies in the fact that. on a trial to uial basis, reaction times to both stimuli primarily 
show a positive correlation. If Taski takes relativeiy long to complete. 'wait' time for Task2 
will likewise be longer and, alternatively. faster Taski processing will be reflected in less 
'wait' time and consequently faster Task2 processing. 
Locus of Cognitive Slack Logic 
In addition. certain predictions can be made, based on the postponement theory and the 
supposition of a 'wait' period. that might help to venfy the existence of such an underlying 
mechanism. The locus of cognitive slack logic c m  be used to interpret the effect of 
manipulating a Taska variable in relation to the PRP bottleneck (McCann & Johnston, 1992; 
Pashler & Johnston, 1989). 
If, for exarnple, the level of difficulty associated with Task2 is varied and the effect of 
this manipulation occurs at a stage of processing that constitutes a bottleneck, or at a stage 
beyond the bottleneck. an additive data pattern across SOAs is observed. 
-------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The reasoning behind this logic can best be explained by refemng to Figure 1. Stages 
1 A through 1 C in Figure 1 refer to hypothetical processing stages necessary to complete a task 
(Taski). Stages 2A through 2C refer to processing necessary for a second task (Taskl). Figure 
I also depicts two levels of difficulty for Task2, easy and hard, and two levels of SOA, short 
and long. 
Let us assume that manipulating the difficulty of Tûsk2, in this hypothetical exarnple, 
affects stage 2B, in that the duntion of stage 2B is longer when Taskz is more difficult. Let us 
further assume that stage 1 B of Taski involves the same processors as stage 2B, thus 
constituting a processing bottleneck. This means that processing involved in stages IB and 2B 
cannot occur in parallel. Stage 2B processing will always have to wait until stage 18 is 
complete. 
As the figure shows, at the long SOA there is no task overlap and dl processing 
necessary to perform Task2 (stages 2A. 3B. 7C) begins after the bottleneck stage of Taskl 
(IB),  regardless of Taskî diffculty. Increasing Task2 difficulty increases the duration of stage 
2B, and this increase in processing time is entirely reflected in response time to the second task 
(RT2). RT;? increases as the duration of stage 2B increases. 
When the two tasks overlap, that is, when SOA is short, processing for Task2 begins 
soon after the commencement of processing for Taski. Figure I shows that, at a short SOA, 
stage 2A begins shortly after the onset of stage 1A. Because stages 1% and 2B cannot be 
canied out simultaneously, stage 2B is postponed until 1B is complete. This postponement of 
stage 28 processing creates a 'wait' period, or penod of cognitive slack (McCann & Johnston, 
1992), allowing any Task2 pmcessing that occurs pnor to stage 2B to continue unintempted. 
However, further processing for Taskz (stages 2B and 2C) cannot continue until the Taskl 
bottleneck stage is free. that is. until stage tB of Taskl is complete. Thus, an increase in the 
duration of stage 28, due to varying the difficulty of Taskz, will again be seen as an increase in 
RT2 as task difficulty increases. Even at short SOAs then, when varying the difficulty of Task2 
affects the duration of a stage of processing at, or beyond, the bottleneck, changes in the 
duration of that stage of processing are fully reflected in RTs This effect will be consistent 
across SOAs and produce a pattern of results that is additive with SOA. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
An example of hypothetical data displaying additive effecü in mean RT is shown in 
Figure 2. Additive effects of Task2 difficulty and SOA have been produced by manipulating 
variables that have their effects late in the sequence of processing stages. at or beyond the PRP 
bottleneck. S-R compatibility for example, a variable believed to affect the stage of response 
selection, has been found to produce additive effects with SOA (McCann & Johnston. 1992). 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
The outcome of manipulating a Task2 variable that has its effect prior to the PRP 
bonleneck is somewhat different. Figure 3 is a schematic representation of the hypothetical 
processing stages employed in perforrning Taski and Task2. Aiso depicted are two levels of 
SOA (long and short), and two levels of Task2 difficulty (easy and hard). In Figure 3, just as 
in Figure 1, stages 1 B and 2B require the use of common processors and hence cannot occur in 
parallel. In contrast to Figure 1 however, Figure 3 depicts a stage of processing afkted by 
varying Task;! difficulty that occurs prior to the bottleneck, that is, the manipulation has its 
effect is at stage 2A. 
When SOA is long the mode1 depicted in Figure 3 is similar to that described in Figure 
1. Rocessing necessary for Task2 can continue uninterrupted and any increase in the duration 
of stage 2 A  brought about by increasing Task2 difficulty, will be refiected in RT2. 
In contrast, at short SOAs. stage 28  must be postponed until stage 1B is complete. 
However, when processing associated with varying Taskz difficulty occurs before the PRP 
bonleneck, it is not affected by postponing Taskr processing. Because a period of cognitive 
slack is created when stage 2B is postponed, stage 2A processing can continue unintempted 
regardless of the duration associated with the level of task difficulty. Although Task2 
processing that involves the bottleneck and subsequent stages will be delayed until bottleneck 
processing for Taski is complete, these stages are not affected by the expenmentai 
manipulation. Consequently, the duration of these later stages will be sirnilar for al1 levels of 
Task2. At short SOAs then, the effect of varying Taskz difficulty. when the manipulation 
affects a stage of processing before the PRP bottleneck, will not be reflected in RT?. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
The overall effect of manipulating a stage of Task2 processing that occurs pnor to the 
PRP bottleneck is that the difference in performance between the levels of Taskz will decrease 
as SOA decreases. The effects of this Taskl difficulty manipulation will therefore be observed 
as being underadditive with decreasing SOA. An underadditive pattern is shown in Figure 4. 
Underadditive effects with decreasing SOA have k e n  observed for Taskz variables, like 
stimulus contrast (Pashler & Johnston, 1989; Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1994a), that are believed 
to affect early processing stages, such as encoding. 
----------------------- 
hsen Figure 5 about here 
An alternative pattern. overadditivity. is predicted by a resource sharing rnodel. 
According to this modeI, the PRP effect is caused by excessive demand on a limited amount of 
resources. This reiationship is affected by the time between tasks in that the closer two tasks 
are to each other the greater the demand on resources. Additionai demand is placed on 
resources if the level of difficulty of one. or both tasks. is increased. This effect, of increasing 
the level of difficulty of Task2, is exacerbated at short SOA compared ro long SOA because 
there is aiready a greater shortage of resources at short SOA than at long. Thus, the effect is 
overadditive with decreasing SOA, and data points will diverge at shoner SOAs and converge 
at longer SOAs. Such a pattern is shown in Figure 5. 
Manipulating a variable that is likely to have an effect at a specific stage of processing 
(e.g., sensory encoding, response selection. etc.), and interpreting the pattem of data using the 
locus of cognitive siack logic described above (McCann & Johnston, 1992; Pashler & 
Johnston, 1 989). has the potential to be a useful rnethod for obtaining empirical evidence 
regarding the locus(i) of the PRP bottleneck. Underadditivity in the resuIts reflects the effects 
of a variable pnor to the PRP bottleneck and additivity reflects the effects of a variable that has 
its locus at, or beyond, the bottleneck. However, overadditivity suggests a capacity-sharing 
resource account of interference which would suggest concurrent processing of Task 1 capacity 
demanding stages and the stage affected by the Task2 manipulation. 
Locus(i) of the PRP Bottleneck 
Perceptuul botrleneck 
Evidence against a perceptual PRP bottleneck cornes in several forms. Primarily, if the 
bottleneck were perceptual in nature the observation of cross-modal PRP effects would r;ot be 
expected. Perceptual processing of information presented to different sensory modalities 
should not yield interference effects like those found by McCann & Johnston (1992) using 
auditory and visual stimuli. In addition, a number of studies have obtained underadditive 
effects by varying stimulus intensity, a variable assumed to have an effect at perceptuai 
encoding (De Jong, 1953; Pashler, 1994a, Pashler & Johnston, 1989). According to the locus 
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of cognitive slack logic, the interaction of stimulus intensity and SOA indicates that the effect of 
the variable is occurring prior to the stage comprising the processing bottleneck, and 
consequently the locus of the bottleneck must be somewhere after the stage at which the effects 
of stimulus intensity occur. 
Response Selection Bottleneck 
Several factors have been shown to affect the response selection stage of information 
processing. Varying the number of response alternatives between simple reaction time (SRT) 
and choice reaction time (CRT), Karlin and Kestenbaum ( 1968) demonstrated underadditive 
effects of number of stimulus-response alternatives with decreasing SOA. Taski was a two- 
alternative discrimination response in which subjects were to discriminate between two digits. 
Taskz was an SRT or two-alternative discrimination response to auditory tones. Stimulus-onset 
asynchrony was varied and subjects responded as quickly as possible to the digit and then to 
the tone. The underadditive pattern suggests that the effect of manipulating the number of 
Taskl response alternatives is occurring at a stage of processing prior to the PRP bottleneck. 
Varying the number of response alternatives most likely has an effect at response selection. If 
the locus of the PRP bottleneck is at a processing stage after response selection the most likely 
candidate for the bottleneck would be the stage of response execution. 
The work of Karlin and Kestenbaum (1968) has not been consistently replicated 
however (Schubert, 1999; Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1997). Using the sarne variable 
manipulation, Van Selst and Jolicoeur (Exp. 2, 1997) demonstrated additive effects of number 
of response alternatives with SOA. The additive pattern observed between SRT and two- 
alternative discrimination response suggests that the effect of manipulating the number of 
response alternatives is occumng at, or beyond, the PRP bottieneck, which in turn suggests 
that the bonleneck is located at, or prior to, response selection. 
It should be noted, nevertheless, that the underlying response mechanism for an SRT is 
most likely different from that of a forced-choice Rsponse (CRT). The effect of varying the 
number of CRT response alternatives (e.g., two-alternative discrimination vs three-alternative 
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discrimination) is usually additive (Schubert, 1999; Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1997), whereas the 
difference between a single response (SRT) and several possible responses (CRT) appears to 
be more variable. One possible difference is that a greater degree of perceptual processing is 
necessary for discrimination (CRT) compared to simple detection (SRT). If the effect is caused 
by an increase in perceptual processing. due to the nature of the task, some attenuation of the 
SRT and CRT RT;! difference may be seen as SOA decreases but the difference between 
alternative CRT conditions (e.g., two-alternative discrimination vs. three-alternative 
discrimination) should remain constant across SOAs. Results consistent with this prediction 
have been reported (Van Selst & Jolicoeur. Exp. 1. 1997). An altemate explanation is that the 
underadditivity sometimes observed between SRT and CRT is a consequence of subjects 
anticipating Sz in the SRT condition rather than responding to it. thereby producing anticipation 
errors (Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 1997). In the SRT condition a single response is repeated and 
cm be anticipated prior to the presentation of the stimulus. Hence. anticipation error times are 
disproportionately fast and generaily the time to respond decreases as the time between S 1 and 
S2 increases. As a result the RT? mean for the SRT responses decreases by a greater amount at 
longer SOAs than at the shorter, producing an underadditive effect with decreasing SOA. 
Anticipation errors are unlikely in CRT because subjects must wait for the stimulus to appear in 
order to make the correct response. Schubert ( 1  999) found thai RT2 response times for tasks 
employing single versus multiple response alternatives (SRT and CRT) were underadditive 
with decreasing SOA when the SRT task was performed pnor to the CRT task but that the 
effect was less pronounced when the CRT task was performed first. Anticipation erron 
occurred only at the longest SOA (SRT = 17.66%; CRT = 0.3%), and were significantly 
higher in the SRT condition when that task had been performed fint compared to when it was 
perforrned 1 s t  (28.7%, 6.04%). In the CRT condition there was no difference in the frequency 
of anticipation errors as a function of order of condition (0.4%,0.2%). Data such as these 
suggests that subjecü are less Iikely to commit anticipation errors in an SRT condition if they 
have fmt k e n  exposed to a task in which they were forced to wait before making their 
response (CRT). When the possibility of anticipation errors in an SRT task was reduced, by 
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including trials in which no S:! was present, the underadditive effect of number of response 
alternatives with decreasing SOA was eliminated (Schubert, 1 999). 
Purther evidence in support of ü bottleneck at response selection cornes from data 
demonstrating the effects of manipuking other variables associated with response selection. 
McCann and Johnston (1992) assessed the effects of overlapping tasks, when response 
difficulty was manipulated, by varying stimulus-response (S-R) cornpatibility. Taski was a 
two-alternative discrimination response in which subjects decided whether the frequency of an 
auditory tone was high or low (McCann & Johnston, Exp. 2, 1992). In Task2 symbolic S-R 
cornpatibility was varied by presenting either arrows, pointing to the nght or to the left and 
responded to using the nght and left hands respectively, or the letters M and T, one to be 
responded to using the right hand and the other using the left hand. Spatial cornpatibility was 
also varied by presenting stimuli in either the left or right visuai field so that on half the trials 
the stimulus position corresponded to the compatible response hand and on the remaining triais 
to the incompatible response hand. It was expected that response times would be faster to 
arrows than to letten, and faster when stimulus position and response hand corresponded 
spatially than when they did not. Of greatest interest was the effect of SOA on these 
manipulations. An additive effect with SOA was predicted for symbolic compatibility. 
Expectations for spatial S-R compatibility were less clear as  evidence exists suggesting that this 
variable may be associated with stimulus identification rather than response selection 
(Hasbroucq & Guiard, 199 1). If this is mie, one would expect to observe a data pattern 
reflecting interference at a stage of processing prior to response selection. Thus, an 
underadditive effect of spatial compatibility with increasing SOA should be present. Indeed, 
McCann and Iohnston did find additive efTects with SOA for symbolic S-R compatibility and 
underadditive effects for spatial S-R cornpatibility suggesting the presence of an interference 
effect occumng at, or beyond, the bottleneck for the former variable and prior to the bottleneck 
for the latter. 
The evidence accumulated thus far points to a locus of the PRP bottleneck at, or before. 
response selection. Research suggests that the bottleneck is not located at an early stage of 
processing but is more supportive of the response selection h ypothesis. 
Response Execrction Bottleneck 
Although evidence presented so far is indicative of a central processing bottleneck, 
possibly at response selection. some researchers have proposed a later PRP bottleneck, at 
response execution (Keele, 1973, McLeod, 1977). As discussed above, the underadditive data 
pattern sometimes revealed when response alternatives are manipulated (e.g., Karlin and 
Kestenbaum, 1968) has been provided by some researchers as support for a response 
execution bortleneck. The logic is that if underadditivity reflects interference happening pnor to 
the PRP bottleneck, and if the SRT -- two-alternative discrimination response RT2 difference 
denotes differences at response selection, then the bottleneck must be at response execution. 
The strongest evidence against a bottleneck at response execution is that the RT2 difierence 
between alternative CRT responses, such as two-alternative discrimination vs three-alternative 
discrimination should a1so reflect an equivaient decrease with decreasing SOA as the difference 
sometimes observed between SRT and CRT Task2 response times. Karlin and Kestenbaum 
(1968) used only SRT and one CRT. a two-alternative discrimination, in their experimentd 
design so it is impossible to determine any differences between alternative CRT responses 
using their data Van Selst and Jolicoeur ( 1997) on the other hand did compare alternative CRT 
responses (two-alternative discrimination and three-alternative discrimination) and found 
additive effects with decreasing SOA, as did Schubert (1999), once again supporting a PRP 
response selec tion bo ttleneck. 
Locus(i) of the Attentional Blink Effect 
From the empiricd evidence it appears then that the PRP bottleneck is located at a 
central stage of processing, possibly at a stage where responses are selected. We may be able 
to use what we know about the locus of the PRP bottleneck to shed light on the location of the 
AB effect. 
Manipulating the same variable in both PRP and AB experimental designs and finding 
an effect of the manipulation in each would allow us. first to detemine the effect in relation to 
the PRP bottleneck by using the locus of cognitive slack logic, and then, perhaps, to ascertain 
the location of the AB effect, also in relation to the PRP bottleneck. 
With this goal in mind, relative signal probability was manipulated in PRP and AB 
expenmental designs. In the PRP paradigm, the signal probability manipulation was associated 
with Taskz whereas in the AB design it was associated with Taski. There is evidence to 
suggest that the effect of varying signal probability is additive with SOA (Luck 19%. Van Selst 
& Jolicoeur, 1997). According to the locus of cognitive slack logic, additive effects of relative 
signal probability and SOA are consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of probability is 
taking place ai. or after, the bottleneck in the PRP. Likewise. the effect of this variable on the 
size of the AB is interpretable in as far as detennining the locus of the probability effect in 
relation to the locus of the AB effect. A variable that changes the size of the AB effect must 
have its effect at, or before, the processing stages(s) that cause(s) the AB effect. It canot have 
its effect after the latest locus contributing to the AB effect. Therefore, if signal probability 
affects the magnitude of the AB. this would suggest that the locus of the probability effect is at 
the locus of the AB effect or before it. 
By the logic outlined above, the effects of probability in experiments designed to 
exhibit PRP and AB effects will enable us to establish more precisely the locus of the AB 
effect. 
Locus(i) of Signal Probability Effects 
Studies manipulating signal probability typically show that stimuli presented more 
frequently lead to faster responses than those presented less frequently (Bertelson, 1966; 
LaBerge & Tweedy, 1964; Miller & Hardzinski, 198 1 ; Theios & Walter, 1974). Various views 
have been proposed as to the fundamental mechanism underlying this finding. Some 
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researchers point to the influence of perceptual factors (Bertelson & Tisseyre. 1966) while 
others attribute the effect to response bias (Sanders. 1970). An intrinsic diffïculty with 
investigations of the effect of relative signal probability is that stimulus frequency is 
confounded with response frequency, as increases in signal frequency are coupled with 
comparable increases in associated responses. Variations in relative stimulus frequency rnay be 
connected with stimulus identification, frequency effects reflecting adjustments in anticipation 
of the presentation of a stimulus (Bertelson & Tisseyre, 1966). Such a mechanism would 
implicate early stimulus encoding as the locus of stimulus probability. Variations in response 
frequency may refiect the expectation of a particular response, thereby affecting a response 
selection stage of processing (Sanders, 1970). If the effect of stimulus probability is a function 
of response factors, then the locus(i) could be at any of the later stages, subsequent to 
encoding. 
Several researchee have attempted to separate the contribution of perceptual and 
response factors in relative probability effects. Bertelson and Tisseyre (1 966) investigated the 
issue by using a many : one stimulus-response arrangement while varying probability of 
stimuli and responses. Four stimuli (uppercase letters) were used, two corresponding to one 
response while the remaining two were associated with an alternate response. Stimulus 
probability was varied for each member of one stimulus pair so that one was of high 
probability (3) and the other low (. 15). Both members of the other pair were assigned 
probabilig values of (. 15). Responses therefore had a lowfhigh (.30 : .70) probability 
associated with them as did the stimuli (.55 : .15), with some decoupling between the two. If 
the probability effect is associated with the response, separate from the stimulus. reaction times 
should be fastest for high frequency responses, regardless of stimulus frequency. On the other 
hand, any difference between conditions where the stimulus frequency was varied but response 
frequency was held constant would suggest perceptual bias. Bertelson and Tisseyre found no 
evidence to support an effect of response probability. Relative frequency of the response did 
not affect reaction time whereas relative frequency of the stimulus did. They concluded that the 
effect of probability is not due to response factors but more iikely has an effect at an early stage 
of information processing such as stimulus identification. 
In contrat, other researchers daim that the stimulus probability effect is a function of 
response frequency rather than early stimulus processing. According to Sternberg's additive 
factors logic ( 1967. 1969) variables that affect different stages of processing should exhibit 
additive effects whereas an interaction between variables should be evident when variables 
affect a common stage of processing. Sanders (Exp. 1. 1970), using two levels of stimulus 
frequency (lowhigh), found an effect of probability that interacted with the amount of motor 
preparation required to elicit a vocal response. In one condition (different-phoneme) response 
information was contained within the first phoneme of a verbal response since each stimulus- 
response pairing began with a different phoneme and thus each required a change in 
preparation state. In another condition (same-phoneme) al1 memben of a stimulus group began 
with the same-phoneme. thereby equating preparation for each response. Overall, same initial 
phoneme responses were significantly faster than different but an effect of probability was only 
evident for responses to stimuli belonging to the different-phoneme response group. Sanders 
(1970) proposed that the effect of probability is, at least in part, due to an effect of motor 
preparation to the most frequent response. Response time is longer when the required response 
does not correspond to the expected response. If perceptual processes had been affected by 
probability in this study. an effect of probability should have ken  observed for the sarne- 
phoneme group as well. However. response times were relatively equal in this group for both 
levels of stimulus probability. 
To determine whether or not the effect of motor preparation is independent, or works in 
conjunction with. response selection, Sanden introduced an S-R cornpatibility manipulation 
(Exp. 2, 1970). S-R compatibility is a variable believed to affect response selection. The same 
first phoneme response conditions (same-phoneme, different-phoneme) were used in this 
expenrnent but within each was a condition in which the response to the stimulus was not 
readily associated. For example, the letter A in the S-R compatible - different phoneme 
condition was responded to as A, while in the S-R incompatible condition the correct response 
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was E. S-R compatible and S-R incompatible conditions were created in the same-phoneme 
group as well as in the different-phoneme group. If motor preparation and response selection 
are common to one stage of processing, an interaction of S-R cornpatibility and type of 
response (sarne-phoneme, different-phoneme) should be observed. A significant difference in 
reaction time as a function of stimulus probability was found across dl conditions. More 
frequent stimuli were responded to faster than less frequent stimuli. There was an effect of S-R 
compatibility, incompatible S-R pairings yielding slower responses than compatible pairing 
and. in the S-R incompatible condition the effect of stimulus probability was stronger in the 
different-phoneme condition than in the sarne-phoneme. As found in the first expenment, the 
effect of probability was only evident for the different-phoneme condition. The effects of 
response preparation (same-phoneme, different-phoneme) and S-R compatibility were found to 
be additive, suggesting that motor preparation and response selection reflect distinct stages of 
information processing and that each is affected by relative signai probability. 
Like Bertelson and Tisseyre ( 1966). Hawkins. MacKay, Holley, Friedin, and Cohen 
(1973) investigated whether the effect of stimulus probability is due to perceptual or response 
bias by using a many : one S-R mapping arrangement. The stimulus set in their study consisted 
of 8 letters which were grouped into pairs so that each stimulus pair was assigned to one 
response. Probability of presentation of the stimuli was varied between members of each letter 
pair so that probability was high (S0) for one member of one pair and low (. 10) for its partner, 
low (. 10) for both members of another pair, and lowest (.OS) for the remaining four stimuli. 
The responses of interest were those associated with .50 and .10 stimulus probabilities. The 
four stimuli associated with the lowest stimulus probability (.OS) were distractors that were 
included to increase task difficulty. S-R compatibility was also varied so that, for some 
subjects, the S-R relationship was highly compatible while for others S-R compatibility was 
low. This was accomplished by having subjects in the S-R compatible condition report the 
comrnonly used narne of a stimulus letter (e.g., D = D). Subjects in the S R  incompatible 
condition were to use another preassigned letter narne to report the stimulus (e.g., D = G). The 
reaction time for vocalized responses indicated significant probability effects for stimulus as 
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well as response factors in the low compatibility condition. but neither of these effects was 
significant in the high S-R compatibility condition. Furthemore. in this study, stimulus and 
response frequency effects both decreased in magnitude as the number of trials increased 
implying that. with practice, subjects change the way they process stimuli . The finding of an 
effect of response frequency is in contrast to the work of Bertelson and Tisseyre ( 1966) who 
found no evidence for response factors. The fact that the effects decrease with practice, and are 
more likely to be found when S-R cornpatibility is relatively Iow, may provide an explanation 
for some of the inconsistencies coming from studies investigating the contribution of stimulus 
and response factors in signal probability. Bertelson and Tisseyre ( 1966), for example, used a 
relatively high S-R compatibility with their stimuli of two letters paired with one response and 
two paired with another response, and did not look for any change in the contribution of 
stimulus and response factors as a function of practice. 
LaBerge and Tweedy (1964) also found effects of stimulus and response frequency 
when probability was varied in a design where one stimulus (coloured shape) was coupled 
with one response hand and two other coloured stimuli were associated with the other response 
hand. Only the two stimuli associated with the same response hand were involved in the 
probability manipulation. Since these stimuli were connected with the same response, response 
probability was controlled and any difference in response tirne could be amibuted to the sole 
effect of stimulus frequency. The probability of the one stimulus (one stimulus: one response 
hand) was consistent across trials and was intermediate (.40) between the probability values 
assigned to the other two stimuli (. 10 : .50 or .50 : .IO). Subjects were instmcted to press the 
appropnate response key as quickly as they could when the stimulus was presented. Between 
the stimuli connected with the sarne response hand, responses were faster to the more 
frequently presented stimulus supporting the theory that the effect of stimulus probability is a 
result of perceptual rather than response bias. 
However, the researchers did note bat, inconsistent with a theory of pure perceptual 
bias, the mean reaction times to the stimulus consistently presented at a frequency rate of .a, 
and linked with an individual response, did not lie in between the other two mean response 
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tirnes (relative probability . I O  : S0). In fact mean RT for this condition was slower than the 
response times to either of the other two stimuli. This observation can be accommodated if the 
probability ratio of the two stimuli associated with the sarne response hand are surnrned (50). 
Thus. under these conditions the slower mean response time cm be explained by including a 
response bias component in the probability equation. The more frequent response (A0) 
producing faster reaction times than the less frequent response (.40). 
In a follow-up experiment LaBerge. Legrand. and Hobbie (1969), using a similar 
paradigm. investigated further whether it was possible that both perceptual and response 
frequency could contribute to the observed effect of signal probability. Again, three coloured 
stimuli were used, one associated with one response hand and the other two with the alternate 
response hand. In contrast to the previous experiment, the relative probability of one of the two 
stimuli associated with one response was different from the probability level assigned to the 
other stimulus associated with the same response. For example, in one condition. one stimulus 
paired with one response was assigned a value of 10 while the other stimulus, paired with the 
same response, was given a value of 40. The stimulus coupled with the other response was 
also given a value of 10. This condition was tenned the 5 : 1 condition because the combination 
of the probability values associated with the stimuli paired with the same response was 5 times 
(40 + 10) that of the stimulus assigned to the other response ( 1  0). In a 9 : 1 condition, the 
relative probability values were 6 for the 1 : 1 S-R pairing, 6 for one of the members of the 2 : 
1 S-R pairing, and 48 for the other. Perceptual probability was measured by subtracting the 
mean RT obtained for the high probability stimulus associated with one response frorn the Iow 
probability stimulus of the sarne response. A measurement of response probability was attained 
by subtracting the mean RT obtained for equal probability conditions of both response hands. 
Both perceptual and response frequency were found to be factors ernbodied in the 
signal probability effect in this study. Nevertheless, the efiect of response probability was 
greater than perceptual probability and the authon proposed that perhaps it is not possible for 
the effect of relative signal probability to exert an equal influence across both dimensions in 
certain circumstances and that. under these conditions. response bias is more likely to 
dominate. 
An altemate way of investigating the locus of the stimulus probability effect is to utilize 
Sternberg's ( 1967. 1969) additive factors logic and manipulate a variable associated with a 
specific stage of processing. observing whether there is a differential effect of that manipulation 
as  signai probability is varied. As previously mentioned, according to the logic of additive 
factors. if variables affect a common stage of processing. an interaction between those 
variables should be evident, whereas the efiects should be additive if the variables affect 
different stages of processing. Using this logic it is possible to determine whether signal 
probability affects the same stage of processing affected by some other variable. For example, 
varying stimulus contrast most likely has an effect at an early, encoding stage of processing. If 
relative signal probability has an effect at the sarne stage, an interaction of signal probability 
with stimulus contrast should be evident. On the other hand, if stimulus probability affects a 
stage of processing other than the one affected by varying stimulus contrast, additive effects 
should be observed. 
Miller and Pachella (1973) varied stimulus quaiity and signal probability in a memory 
scanning choice reaction tirne (CRT) experiment in which subjects were to make a positive 
response to stimuli (digits) that were mernbers of a previously mernorized set of items and a 
negative response to other stimuli. Signal probability of items within both sets was varied and 
an interaction of stimulus quality and signal probability was found, indicating that the effect of 
probability was occumng at a stage comrnon to the locus of the stimulus quality effect. 
Moreover, there was no interaction of probability and response type (positivehegative) 
implying that, in this experiment, probability did not affect a stage of processing associated 
with the response to a stimulus, such as response selection or execution. Additional support for 
the encoding stage as the locus of the signal probability effect was provided when an 
interaction of stimulus probability and quality was found when subjects were simply to name 
the stimulus. 
It is very likely that the output of stimulus information. processed during the encoding 
stage, is in some form other than a basic physical representation. possibly in the form of a 
name code (Wattenbarger, cited in Nickerson, 197 1). Wattenbarger designed an experiment to 
determine whether stimulus comparisons were based on physical identity or the narnes of 
items. Subjects were to decide whether a probe character. which was a letter. had appeared 
within a target set of letters. There were four conditions: - a) a control condition in which the 
target set and the probe were lower case letters; b) a control condition in which targets and 
probe were uppercase letters: c) a name identity condition where targets were presented in both 
upper and lowercase and the subject's task was to match the probe, which could be in either 
case, to a letter of the sarne name; d) a physical identity condition in which various letters 
appeared in either upper or lower case and the subject's task was to match the probe to a letter 
that had the same physical representation. Target letters were presented sequentially, one at a 
time, at a rate of one every two seconds, except in condition c) where they appeared two at a 
time (upper and lower case). The probe appeared after the last target letter. Subjects' task was 
to judge whether they had seen the probe letter in the target set using the appropriate criteria, 
depending on the condition, as the basis for their decision. Wattenbarger predicted that, if 
comparison is based on the physical image of the stimulus, the dope function relating reaction 
time to target set size in the physical identity condition should be the same as that obtained in 
the two control conditions, and the slope for the name condition should be approximately twice 
that of the othen, owing to the fact that two target letters were presented in the narne identity 
condition and therefore comparison time would take longer in that condition. If comparison is 
based on the name of the stimulus, the slope function of the name identity condition should be 
equal to control conditions, while the slope of the physicai identity condition should be greater. 
Wattenbarger reasoned that the slope in the physical identity condition would be greater in this 
case because, if a name was used to make the comparison it would have to incorporate case 
I information (e.g., K = 'upper Kay') and would 
comparisons involved in the other conditions. 
therefore require more processing time than 
Results from this study supponed the hypothesis that stimulus cornparisons are based 
on name identity. The slope of the hnction for the physical identity condition was almost twice 
as great as that of the other conditions which were al1 very similar. This result however 
provides no evidence against the possibility that subjects base their decisions on narnes 
sometimes and on physical features at other times, perhaps using both comparison procedures 
and eventuaily relying on whichever one results in the quickest response. Ln the control and the 
name identity conditions in this experiment, if narnes of stimuli were the sarne, the physical 
images would also be the same, rneaning that if subjects based their decision on a physical 
match in these conditions their response would not be incorrect. In contrast, in the physical 
identity condition, stimuli could have the same names but differ physically. Consequently, 
subjects were forced to be careful in this condition not to make a response based on name only. 
Lending more support to the narning hypothesis was the finding that, in the physical 
identity condition where the target set contained upper and lower case letters and task was to 
match the probe to a target that was physically the sarne, time to respond was slower on trials 
where a target item had the sarne name but differed in case. If the comparison process is based 
on physical features there is no reason for reaction times to be longer when the names of 
stimuli are the same but physical representations differ. However, it is frequently found that 
reaction tirnes are faster when stimuli share the same name as well as the same physical 
appearance compared to when only the name of the stimulus is the sarne (as in a name identity 
task when two letters have the sarne narne but differ in case) (Nickerson, 1971). This fact again 
provides support for the possibility that physical feanire infonnation and narne information can 
somehow be cornbined and used in the comparison process. 
Wattenbarger (cited in Nickerson, 197 1) concluded that, in the studies he conducted, 
visual representations of the target and probe items were transforrned either to the actual name 
of the stimulus or to some other, more abstract state. He proposed that the form the stimulus 
takes at this stage is adequate for identification and hence is produced prior to the comparison 
process itself. 
Theios ( 1975) proposed that there are at least two substages that make up the encoding 
stage. An initial preprocessing stage and an identification stage in which a name or abstract 
code for a stimulus is generated whenever the stimulus material allows. 
Consistent with this theory is the observation of an interaction of stimulus probability 
and stimulus quality for namable stimuli (digits) in a memory scanning task, but not for 
nonsense symbols (a solid shape presented at various orientations) (Miller & Pachella, 1976), 
though main effects of stimulus quality and probability were observed for the nonsense stimuli. 
The nonsense symbols in this experiment did not have preassigned names attached to hem 
and, when they were modified so that their appearance was more like that of digits (line figures 
rather than solid), perhaps making hem easier to name, a small interactive effect (approaching 
significance) between stimulus quality and stimulus probability was found. These results 
suggest that an interaction between stimulus quaiity and stimulus probability only occun when 
the stimuli are narnable. If, during an early stage of processing certain kinds of stimulus 
material allow for the conversion of a physical representation to some form of code. this stage 
may be the locus of stimulus probability, as well as stimulus quaiity effects. Moreover, ii 
appears that, if stimuli are not easily namable, an abstract code, perhaps created for a specific 
stimulus in an experiment, will suffice. 
Pachella and Miller (Exp. 1, 1976) investigated further the nature of the effect of 
stimulus probability on stimulus encoding. Upper and lowercase letten were used as stimuli in 
a name matching task. Two letters were presented together and any pair of stimuli with the 
same name were to be classified as 'same' while those with different names were 'different.' 
Four letters were used, two of them were assigned to a high probability group (32) and two to 
a low probability group (. 18). High probability letters were never matched with low probability 
letters. The pairs were presented either as physically identicai (e.g., A-A = same), sarne letter 
diffenng only in case (e.g., A-a = same), or different letters (e.g., A-G = different). The 
interaction of probability and trial type (physically identicai, same ietterldifferent case. and 
different letter) was significant for error data @ c .OS) but did not quite attain statistical 
significance for reaction time, The effect of stimulus probability appeared to be evident for the 
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different case and different letter conditions but not for the physically identical condition (sarne 
lettedsame case). The authors proposed that. in matching letters that were physically the sarne, 
the generation of a name code would likely have been to no advantage in performing this task. 
The effect of probability was not found under these conditions thereby providing further 
support for the locus of the probability effect at a stage of processing where some form of 
stimulus code is generated. 
In a similar letter matching experiment, a stimulus quality variable (degradation) was 
introduced (Pachella & Miller, Exp. 2, 1976). A main effect of stimulus quality was found as 
well as effects of probability, trial type, and an interaction of probability and trial type. The 
effect of probability was again not evident in the physical match condition. Furthemore, an 
interaction of quality and probability was not detected in any condition. The authors proposed 
that. in this expenment, the effects of degradation had been removed from the stimulus 
representation early on, prior to the stage in which a name is derived. Matching tasks, like the 
ones used in this experiment, undoubtedly require comparison of the physical attributes of the 
stimulus pair and it is possible that, if this comparison process occun prior to name code 
generation, the effects of stimulus degradation are rernoved at the physical comparison stage, 
before processing involved in the production of a name code begins. This theory predicts 
additive effects of stimulus quality and probability at each level of processing (Le., trial type) 
which is what was observed here. 
When instructions to the subject were modified so that letter pairs that differed in case 
were now to be classified on the bais of physical dissimilarity and judged as different (A-a = 
different), the effect of probability failed to reach a significant level for any of the three trial 
types (physically identical, same letter diffenng only in case, or different letters) (Pachella & 
Miller, Exp. 3, 1976). This lack of an effect of probability provides funher support for the 
theory that signal probability has at least part of its efTect at a stage of processing where a name 
code is generated. Once the matching tasks in this study were modified so that cornparisons 
were based on the physicai characteristics of the stimuli, the name of the stimulus may have 
become irrelevant for completion of the task. 
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Because no effect of probability was observed when the task was reduced to one based 
on comparing physical representations. and no effect of probability was evident in the physical 
match condition in their initial experiment, Pachella and Miller (1976) proposed that the 
differential effects of probability are due to whether or not a name code is used to perform the 
task. Besner ( 1977), however, provided an alternative explanation. Using the same stimuli 
(upper and lower case letters). and trials types (physically identical, sarne letterldifferent case, 
different letter), as Pachella and Miller (Exp. 1, 1976), Besner found that physical match trials 
were performed faster than sarne nameldifferent case trials, but the effects of probability were 
evident for both conditions. The methodological modification in this expenment was the 
introduction of a delay of 500 ms between the stimuli to be rnaiched. In this experiment then, 
probability had an effect on the cornparison of physically identical stimuli suggesting that it is 
not the activation of a name code, per se, that is affected by probability. Besner (1977) 
proposed instead that the significant factor in probability effects is the interaction between 
rnemory and perception. 
According to the name code hypothesis it may be possible to transfer the effects of 
probability from one stimulus to another if both stimuli have the sarne name, or abstract code. 
Miller first investigated the issue of probability transfer by attempting to ascenain whether 
probability is having an effect because of increased activation of separate features of the 
stimulus or whether the effect is the outcorne of increased activation of the specific fom of the 
stimulus (Miller, 1979). If the effect is at the feature detection level, then the probability 
manipulation might be transferable to lettea that are compnsed of sirnilar features. On the other 
hand, no transfer would be expected if probability is having its effect on the specific form of 
the stimulus. 
In Miller's study (Exp. 1, 1979), the stimuli used were two sets of letters pairs, each 
member of a pair king physically similar to its partner (e.g., 1 : T and K : R). The probability 
of presentation of each letter was varied so that one letter of one pair had a high probabil@ of 
presentation (e.g., 1 = .46), while one letter of the other pair had a low probability (e-g., K = 
-04). The remaining two letters were presented equally often (e.g., T = .25, R = .25). The 
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high probability letter (e-g., 1) and the low probability letter (e.g.. K). aithough mernbers of 
different stimulus pairs, were assigned to one response. The other two letters (e.g., T and R). 
with probabilities of 2 5 ,  were assigned to another response. Stimulus quality was also varied 
so that in one block of trials. subjects saw the stimuli under normal viewing conditions; in 
another block, the contrat between the stimulus and its background was reduced; and in a third 
block, a random dot pattern array was displayed after the stimulus was presented. Probability 
effecu were expected on the letters to which a direct lowhigh probability manipulation (direct 
condition) had been applied (e.g. K = low: 1 = high). Transfer of these effects to visually 
similar letters (T and R), that is letters that shared features comrnon to the letters in the direct 
condition, was predicted if probability is having an effect at the feature detection level. 
Othewise no transfer of the effect was expected. Thus. if the effect of probability is having an 
effect at the feature detection level the effect of probability expected to be observed for the high 
probability (.48) letter (e.g.. 1) should also be observed for the physically similar letter (T), 
even though the probability of that letter is considerably lower (.25). Likewise, the effect of 
low stimulus frequency expected to be observed for the low probability (0.4) letter (e.g., K) 
should be transferred to the physically similar letter (R), even though the probability of that 
letter is higher (25). 
Although effecü of probability were evident in the direct condition. Miller found no 
transfer of probability to letters that were physically sirnilar or, in another experiment (Miller, 
Exp. 3, 1979). to stimuli that had the same name but were physicaily different (e.g., Y and 
Y). These resulü suggest that the effect of probability is not at the feature detection level of 
stimulus encoding. For physically similar stimuli (e.g., 1 and T) an interaction of stimulus 
quality and probability was observed for the direct condition, but this interaction was not found 
for the stimuli that h d  the same name and were physically different (e.g.. Y and Y). In the 
former case a name code may have k e n  necessary in order to perform the task of idemiQing 
the letters and thus an interaction of stimulus quality and probability was obtained, whereas in 
the latter case use of a narne code may have been of no benefit to performing the task since both 
items had the same narne (Miller, 1979). 
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Miller and Hardzinski (Exp. 1 ,  198 1 ) obtained an interaction of stimulus quality and 
probability in a direct probability manipulation condition in a memory scanning task (positive 
and negative sets). Letten contained within the memory set were upper and lower case but the 
probability manipulation was associated with only one case, either upper or lower. The 
question of interest was whether the effects of probability would transfer from one case to the 
other. An interaction of stimulus quaiity and probability was found when probability was 
directly manipulated. The observation of an interaction of stimulus quality and probability 
suggests once again that a name code was necessary to complete this task, and that the effects 
of stimulus degradation and probability interact under such conditions. In the probability 
transfer condition, a main effect of stimulus quaiity was found but no effect of probability. It 
would seem that. in this memory search task, even though the upper and lower case letters had 
the same name, use of a name code would be necessary in order to confirm whether or not the 
stimulus was a rnember of the positive set. Yet in this expenment, as in others (Miller, 1979) 
where the use of a name code would seemingly predict transfer of probability effects to stimuli 
of the sarne narne (different case), no such transfer was evident. When the experimental design 
was rnodified somewhat, so that only one case size was used and direct and indirect conditions 
were confined to blocks of trials, rather than between triais, a small effect of probability was 
obtained in the transfer condition, though no interaction of quality and probability (Exp. 3, 
198 1). In this modified version of the experiment the same case (upper or lower) was used 
throughout. In the first block of trials different values of relative probability were assigned to 
each stimulus. In the following block, using the same stimuli (i.e.. sarne Ietterslsame case), 
stimulus frequency was equiprobable and any transfer of the effect of probability from the fmt 
to the second block of trials was assessed. Although a small effect of probability was seen here 
in the transfer condition, no such effect was observed in an experiment that differed only in that 
the stimuli presented in the second block of trials were of the altemate case to those in the fmt 
block (Exp. 2, 198 1). Thus, transfer of probability effects are possible using this experimental 
procedure but they appear to be transient and are possibly difficult to detect (Miller & 
Hardzinski, 198 1). 
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Using a stimulus matching paradip similar to Miller's other experiments reported here 
(Miller, Exps 1 & 3, 1979) transfer of probability effects were found for non-aiphanumeric 
stimuli that were visually similar and highly classifiable (Miller, Exp. 4, 1979). The four 
stimuli used in this experiment were an X with a line above or below it and a diamond shape 
with a line above or below it. An interaction of stimulus quality and stimulus probability was 
evident in both the direct and indirect probability manipulation conditions. C o n w  to the 
findings of Miller and Pachella (1976). who found no interaction of stimulus quality and 
probability when using nonsense stimuli, these data imply that even though the stimuli used in 
this experiment were not designated some preassigned name, individuais were abie to develop 
some son of abstract code for them and thus a quality by probability effect was evident. These 
findings also show that the effects of a direct manipulation of probability are transferable to 
specific stimuli. Miller (1979) suggests that the difference between these stimuli and those used 
in his previous experiments where no transfer of pmbability was found, as weli as those used 
by Miller and Pachella (1976) where no interaction of stimulus quality and probability was 
found, is that the stimuli used here are composed of a fixed set of binary features that are 
shared amongst them (Le., X, diamond shape, top bar, bottom bar). An abstract code based on 
a combination of these feanires could be produced for the stimuli, which in tum would mean 
that the codes share common dimensions. It is because of the shared characteristics between the 
abstract codes that a transfer of the probability effect might have occurred. Using stimuli that 
are not made up of combinations of binary features likely means that the stimuli are coded on 
an individual basis, having no common coding dimension. In a subsequent expriment, when 
the stimuli were modified so that common binary features could not be used as the bais for 
coding, no transfer of the probabiiity effect was observed (Miller, Exp. 6, 1979). In addition, 
though there was an effect of probability as well as an effect of stimulus quality in the direct 
probability manipulation condition there was, again, no interaction between these variables. 
Miller (1979) proposed that the interaction of stimulus quality and probability depends to a 
large degree on the conceptual or linguistic relationships between stimuli and consequently it is 
found using some stimuli but not others. 
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Subsequently Miller and Hardzinski ( 1981 ), in a memory scanning task, tested whether 
probability effects transferred when letter stimuli were varied on the basis of case, font, size. 
and visual dissimilarity (letters had the different names but differed visually from each other by 
one feature, e.g., O and Q). In this snidy. although the effect of probability was highly 
significant, transfer was only observed to letters that were reduced in size. There was no 
transfer of probability effects to letters that differed in case, font, or to different-narne letters 
that had one different feature. 
On the one hand these findings suggest that a process tied to the analysis of the physicai 
features of stimuli is affected by signal probability. On the other hand, Miller (Exp. 4, 1979) 
found no evidence of transfer to visually similar letteo that had a different name thereby 
suggesting that feature detection is not the only factor involved in the probability effect. 
Coupled with the findings reported by Miller and PachelIa (1976) and PachelIa and Miller 
( 1976). the results suggest that the effect of probability arises in the process of producing a 
code associated with the stimulus and that transfer of probability effects is specific to the way 
this code is activated (Miller & Hardzinski, 1981). 
Miller and Hardzinski (198 1) proposed that stimuli are initially andyzed in terms of 
physical features which in tum activates a narne or abstract code associated with the stimulus or 
with a group. possibly a category. of stimuli. Signal probability effects arise because the 
frequency at which a stimulus is presented affects the threshold required for the activation of 
the code. The direct manipulation of signal probability causes a lower threshold of activation 
for high probability stimuli, leading to faster responses. Stimuli presented less fnquently have 
a higher activation threshold. When a code that is usehil to performing a task is shared between 
stimuli, the effect of signal probability cm transfer from one stimulus to another (Miller, Exp. 
5, 1979; Miller & Hardzinski, Exp. 4, 1981). However, as the studies reported here suggest, 
transfer is not always predictable, and much remains to be understood regarding the 
mechanism behind the effects of relative stimulus probability, and the transfer of these effects. 
Though we might expect transfer of probability effects under conditions where a stimulus code 
is generated, caution should be taken with respect to the simplicity of this assumption. The 
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relationship between factors like task complexity. the type of task (e.g., memory scanning vs 
matching), and the specific form of the code (e.g., name vs abstract), rnust be considered as an 
important element that contributes toward the specific effects of stimulus probability. For 
exarnple, the use of a name code that is highly salient to the subject may be affected by 
probability in a different way than an abstract code that has been generated for the sole purpose 
of perf'orrning an experimentai task. One possibility is that the former. because of its high 
degree of salience, may be composed of independent stimulus and response codes. whereas the 
latter, having been specifically generated for the task at hand, might combine stimulus and 
response information into one code. The consequence of this difference might serve to explain 
why an interaction between stimulus quality and probability is sometimes. but not always, 
found. The stage at which an abstract code. that includes stimulus and response information, is 
genented may be later in the information processing sequence. subsequent to the stage affected 
by stimulus quality. Hence, additive effects of stimulus quality and stimulus probability would 
be observed. In conuast. the stage at which a salient name code, independent of response 
information, is produced, may be common to the locus of the effects of stimulus quality, thus 
producing an interaction between these variables. 
Miller ( 1979) provided an account of the mechanism underlying the interaction of 
stimulus qua1 ity and stimulus probability that is sometimes observed under conditions where a 
rneaninghil code is used to select a response. The interaction is based on the activation 
threshold associated with the probability of a stimulus. Stimulus codes are activated more 
easily under normal viewing conditions than under degraded conditions simply because 
sensory information is of higher quality under normal conditions. However, high probability 
stimuli, having a lower threshold, are less affected by stimulus degradation than are low 
probability stimuli and thus an interaction of stimulus quaiity and probability is observeci. As 
the probability of a stimulus increases, the effects of degradarion decrease (Miller, 1979; Miller 
& Hardzinski, 198 1 ). 
As already mentioned. stimulus quaiity and probability do not aiways interact and this 
account of the effect of signal probability does not accommodate those occasions where himy 
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significant probability effects were found but stimulus quality and probability were additive 
(Miller, Exps. 2 & 6 ,  1979; Miller & Pachella. Exp. 2, 1976; Pachella & Miller. Exps. 2 & 3, 
1976). If the interaction of stimulus quality and probability is dependent on recoding the 
stimulus using a particular type of abstract code, then, when stimulus quality and probability 
are additive, one rnight presume the absence of this type of coding. When the coding stage is 
absent, the effect of stimulus degradation may have been removed from the stimulus prior to 
the effect of signal probability, and consequently the locus of signal probability must come 
after the encoding stage. Certainly, as previously mentioned, there could be more than one 
locus of probability effect. If subjects do not use abstract codes to perform the task, then they 
may be able to create direct visuo-motor links and by-pass the intervening coding stage (as 
suggested by Miller & Hardzinski, 198 1). In this case the effect of probability would not be 
due to increased activation of an associated code but rnay be the result of more frequent 
activation of the visuo-motor Link (Miller, 1979). If the locus of signal probability is 
subsequent to the encoding stage, it is possible in situations when no code is used, or perhaps 
when the code contains paired stimulus and response information, that it is located at a stage of 
response selection as suggested by Sanders ( 1970). 
The literature on signal probability is complex and contains a number of apparent 
empirical discrepancies. As it is still not entirely clem at what processing stage, or stages, 
signal probability has its effect, more work, using a different approach would be beneficial. 
Experiments 3 and 4 in this thesis use the PRP expenmenial paradigm and the locus of 
cognitive slack logic to determine the locus of signal probability effects in relation to the PRP 
bottleneck. We intend to use the results from these experirnents to help discover the locus of 
the AB effect. Therefore, given that Miller (1979; Miiier & Hardzinski, 198 1) found evidence 
for a high degree of stimulus specificity in effects of signal probability, it was important to 
perform PRP experiments the results of which would be relevant for a pair of cornpanion AB 
experiments. 
Though signal probability has not ken  used in an identicai manner to the experiments 
reported here, it has k e n  employed as  an independent variable in previous PRP snidies (Luck, 
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1999; Van Selst & Jolicoeur. 1997). In these earlier studies, the effects of signal probability 
and SOA were additive, suggesting a locus at. or beyond, the PRP bottleneck 
In the following experiments the manipulation of signal probability was applied to 
Task2 in the PRP pandigm and to Taski in the AB design. In the AB experiments, the 
question of interest is whether the manipulation of signal probability modulates the AB effect. 
In addition, we wish to know whether the effect is dependent on having a speeded response in 
Taski. The results from the PRP experiments will be interpreted using the locus of cognitive 
slack logic to evaluate where the effects of signal probability are occumng in relation to the 
PRP bottleneck. 
Experiment 1 
The initial task was to determine the effects. if any. of relative signal probability on the 
AB. With this in rnind an AB expriment was designed in which relative signal probability was 
implemented as a variable associated with Taski. 
Method 
Subjects 
Seventy-eight undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo were paid a 
nominal arnount to participate in the study. AI1 subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. 
Stimuli 
Al1 experimental sessions were mn on a SVGA colour cornputer screen controlled by a 
384,486, or 586 CPU. Stimuli were uppercase letters presented in Rapid Serial Visual 
Presentation (RSVP) in the center of the screen for a duration of 100 ms with no blank 
interstimulus interval (ISI). Al1 the letters were presented in white on a black background, 
except the target stimulus (Tl), which was presented in red. Background Stream items were 
selected at random without replacement from the letten of the alphabet excluding H, O, S, X, 
or Y. There were 6 - 9 letters (this number was selected randornly at run tirne) presented pnor 
to Tl, and 9 - 12 letters (also selected randomly at run time) following Tl. The probe stimulus 
(T2) occurred in any one of the 8 TpT2 positions following Tl (henceforth referred to as T 1-T2 
Iag 1-8). This procedure insured that there were always 1 - 4 letters presented after T2, thus 
providing the T2 masking conditions necessary to observe an AB effect (Giesbrecht and Di 
Lollo, 1999; Jolicoeur, 1999a). 
Letters subtended about 10 of visual angle. The white letters had an approximate 
luminance of 25 cd/m2 on a black background of less than 1 cdm2. Red stimuli had an 
approximate luminance of 26 cd/m2. As the experiments were conducted on several cornputers, 
average values are reported here. Note that the luminance of the white and red letter was 
similar, thus reducing the possibility that Tl would mask T2 more than distractor stimuli. 
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Procedure 
On two-thirds of the trials a red target letter (Ti) appeared within the stream of white 
letters (Tl -present trials). On the remaining trials no Ti letter appeared (T 1 -absent trials). Tl 
could be one of 3 letters. either an H, an O, or an S. The relative probability of the letters was 
varied and had a ratio of 1 : 4: 9. Thus, one letter was presented 9 times in 14 TI-present trials, 
another was presented 4 times, and another 1 time. The probability of each letter was 
counterbalanced across every 6 subjects so that each possible assignrnent of each probability 
level to each letter was used once. Thus, each letter occurred at each probability level equally 
often and the probability manipulation was not confounded with letters. On al1 trials, a probe 
stimulus (T2) appeared in the stream. On half the trials T2 was an X and on the remainder a Y. 
Reaction time to Tl was recorded, and responses were made by pressing the assigned 
key on the keyboard. The following keys were assigned as Tl response keys: ,< for H; .> 
for 0: and /? for S. In the Tl-absent condition, subjects were instructed to wait until the end 
of the stream of letters and then to press the space bar. This response was not speeded. 
At the end of the letter stream, a prompt for a response to T2 appeared ("Did you see an 
X or a Y?"). The X key was used for an X response and the C key for a Y response. 
Consequently, subjects used their left hand to respond to T2 and their right hand to make a 
response to T 1. 
Following each trial, feedback was given in the forrn of plus or minus signs indicating 
to the subject whether the Tl and T2 responses made on the previous trial had been correct or 
incorrect. These feedback signs appeared adjacent to each other and were presented in the 
centre of the screen. Thus, they also served as a fixation point for the next trial. The kft  sign 
was indicative of performance on Tl, and the right of performance on T2. Each trial was 
iniiiated by pressing the space bar, which caused the fixation symbols to disappear, and the 
next RSVP stream to begin 750 ms later. 
At the beginning of the experimentai session, subjects were required to read 
instructions regarding the experimentai procedure. The instructions were then repeated verbaily 
by the experimenter. The experiment began with 2 blocks of 32 practice trials each, followed 
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by 672 experimental trials divided equally into 8 blocks of trials. A complete crossing of the 
factors, Tl probability condition (Tl-present 1 : 4 : 9, Tl-absent 7), T2 letter (X or Y). and Tl- 
T2 lag ( 1  - 8), consisted of 336 trials. or 4 blocks. In each complete crossing of al1 of the 
facton the TI letter assigned to the probability I condition was presented 16 times, so that each 
of the T2 letters (X and Y) appeared once at every T 1 -T? lag. The letter assigned to the 
probability 4 condition appeared 64 times. each T2 letter appearing 4 times at every TpT2 lag. 
And the letter assigned to the probability 9 condition appeared on 144 trials, so that each of the 
Tz letters was presented 9 times at every Ti-Tz hg. Thus Tl appeared on 224 trials, according 
to the probability level assigned to the Ti letter. and. in conjunction, each T2 letter was 
presented at every T 1-T2 lag. The Tl-absent condition (probability 7) was tested on 1 12 trials. 
On these trials each T? letter appeared 7 t h e s  ai each Tl-Tz lag. This complete crossing was 
presented twice throughout the expriment, making a total of 672 trials. 
The first task on each trial was to identify Tl and respond as quickly as possible by 
pressing the appropriate response key. On Tl-absent trials subjects were to wait until the end of 
the stream and then press the space bar (not speeded). Following the letter stream, or after the 
space bar was pressed on Tl-absent trials, a prompt for a response to T2 appeared ("Did you 
see an X or a Y?"). Subjecü were infomed at the beginning of the experimental session that 
ihis response was not speeded. Subjecü were debnefed at the conclusion of the experiment. 
Results 
Individual subject data was checked for Task2 accuracy to ensure that al1 subjects could 
perform the task of identifying T2 when Tl was absent. Thirty individuals who failed to 
perform at or above 69% accuracy on T a s k ~  on trials where Tl was correctly judged as absent, 
were eliminated from further analyses, leaving 48 subjects in the data set. 
Analysis of Taskl accuracy and response thes  
Ceil means were computed for Taski response times and accuracy rates for each 
subject, probability level(1 : 4 : 9), and Tl-T2 lag (1 - 8). Each ce11 for each subject was 
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screened for outliers which removed 2.5% of the correct responses (see Van Selst & Jolicoeur, 
1994b). The cell means were entered in to an ANOVA which revealed main effects of 
probability for Task reaction time [F (2.94) = 1 18.7, p < .O00 1, MS, = 16 lO2.4] and 
accuracy [F (2.94) = 23.9. p < .O00 1, MS, = .O3 11. Subjects were fastest, with highest 
accuracy, on trials on which the probability of the Tl letter was 9 and were slowest, with the 
lowest accuracy rate, on the probability 1 trials. On trials where the probability of the Tl letter 
was 4, reaction time and accuracy were intermediate between the probability I and 9 values. 
(See Appendix A for Taski reaction Urnes and accuracy rates for each probability at each TpT2 
lag.) 
Analysis of Task2 accuracy 
Those triais on which the response to Taskl was correct were analyzed for accuracy on 
Taskz. For Tl  -present trials ceIl means for accuracy on Taskl with probability ( 1 . 4  : 9) and 
TI-T2 lag ( 1 - 8) as variables were calculated and entered in to an ANOVA. Results are show 
in Figure 6. 
----------------------------------- 
Insen Figure 6 about here 
---------------------------- 
In cornparison to accuracy on Tl-absent trials (0.795), accuracy on identibing T2 when 
Tl  was present was severel y attenuated (0.692) [F( 1,47) = 124.9, p < ,000 1, MS, = ,0091. 
Figure 6 shows mean accuracy on Task2 for each Ti-Tt lag and each probability level. In an 
analysis of TI-present trials, a main effect of probability [F(2,94) = 2 1.3, p c .0001, MS, = 
.O281 indicated that, overall, a larger AB effect was evident for trials where the Tl letter was 
presented least frequently compared to trials on which the Tl letter was presented most 
frcquently. A main effect of TpT2 lag showed that, in al1 probability conditions, accuracy was 
most reduced at the eariier TI-TZ lags and improved steadily as T I - T ~  lag increased, reaching 
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performance equal to that of controls (Ti-absent trials) at TI-Tz lag 7 [F(7. 329) = 36.6. p < 
.0001. MS, = -0321. An interaction of probability and TpT2 lag revealed that performance in 
the probability 9 condition returned to be equal that of the control condition at an earlier Tl-T2 
lag than the other two probability conditions [F(14,658) = 1.9. p < .026, MS, = .027]. The 
probability 1 condition was the slowest to retum to performance equal to that of the control 
condition. (See Appendix B for Task2 accuracy for each probability at each Ti-T? lag.) 
Analysis of Tl -not repeated and TI - repeated trials 
Because relative signal frequency was manipulated in this experiment, so that some Tl 
letters were presented more often than others, it is possible to look at the effect, if any, of 
stimulus repetition. This effect, known as the repetition effect (Bertelson, 196 1 ), occurs when 
the sarne stimulus is repeated on successive trials. Response time to a repeated stimulus is 
typically faster, and accuracy higher. than to an aitemate stimulus. In the results reported here, 
there may be an effect of repeating Tl on T2 accuracy. If the TI letter was the same as on an 
irnmediately preceding bal  (Tl-repeated), the effect on T2 accuracy may be different from that 
observed when the Ti letter was not the same (Tl-not repeated). On Tl-repeated trials, where 
response times to Ti is iikely to be faster. and accuracy higher, than on Ti-not repeated trials. 
less of an intefierence effect may be apparent in Task2. 
Finding an effect of stimulus repetition in this experiment would allow us to use this 
variable in a manner sirnilar to stimulus probability, i.e. determine the locus of the effect in 
relation to the loci of the AB effect and the PRP bottleneck. 
(N.B. stimulus repetition is a term used to refer to a variable manipulated in the 
experiments in this thesis. When used in this context, the term refers to the repetition effect in 
general and is not meant to imply that the effect of repetition is solely a function of repeating the 
stimulus). 
As before, only those trials in which the response to Taski was correct werr analyzed 
for accuracy on Task2. The data were submitted to a new analysis in which T;! performance 
was evaluated for trials on which the Tl letter was the same as on the previous trial (Ti- 
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repeated) and compared io that of trials where the Tl letter on the previous triai was not the 
same (T 1 -not repeated). In other words, trials that were same-T 1 triais were compared to trials 
that were different-T 1. Because the number of observations of a repeated Tl letter was 
relatively small for the probability 1 and 4 conditions, only triais that made up the probability 9 
condition were used and analyzed for effects of Tl -T2 lag and triai type (T 1 -not repeated 1 T 1 - 
repeated). 
Insert Figure 7 about here 
Analysis of the difference in overall T2 accuracy between TI-not repeated and Tl- 
repeated probability 9 trials approached, but failed to reach, statistical significance [F( 1,47) = 
3.1, p > .084, MS, = .012]. Figure 7 shows mean accuracy on Task2 for each Tl-T;! lag and 
each level of probability. The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Ti-Tz lag [F(7.329) = 35.8, p 
< .O00 1, MS, = .O1 61. There was no interaction between Tl-not repeated I Tl-repeated and 
TI-T2 lag [F(7,329) = 0.98, p < .45. MS, = .014]. Though both trial types exhibited an AB 
effect the pattern of perfomance on each was a little different. (See Appendix C for Task2 
accuracy at each T 1 -Tz lag.) 
Despite the lack of an interaction in the analysis reported above, the data pattern in 
Figure 7 suggests that an interaction between Tl-not repeated / Tl-repeated and Tl-T? lag 
exists. The difference between Tl-repeated and Tl-not repeated trials appears to be p a t e r  at 
the shorter Tl-T2 lags than at the longer lags suggesting a difference in the size of the AB effect 
as a function of whether Tl was repeated or not repeated. In an attempt to pull out this 
interaction we submitted the data to a new analysis. First, the difference between Tl-repeated 
and TI-not repeated at each Tl-T2 lag, for each subject. was cdculated. The means of these 
difference scores across the early Ti-Tz lags, TpT2 lags 1 - 4, and across the later Tl-T2 lags, 
TpT2 lags 5 - 8. were then computed. Thus, means of the dflerence between Tl-repeated and 
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T p o t  repeated, for short and long Ti-T2 lags, were produced. The difference between these 
means was statistically significant [F( 1,47) = 5.5, p < -023, MS, = .ûû5], showing a small 
but reliable decrease in the size of the AB when Ti was repeated across consecutive trials. 
In this expenment then. an effect of stimulus repetition was found for trials in the 
probability 9 condition. A T 1 stimulus that was the same as the Ti letter on the irnmediately 
preceding trial produced less of an interference effect in Taskl than a trial in which the Tl letter 
was the not the same. The effect of stimulus repetition was also found to be greater when T2 
appeared at the earl y T 1 -T2 lags ( 1 - 4) than when i t appeared at the later T 1 -T2 lags (5 - 8). 
Like stimulus probability, this variable can be used to provide evidence as to e locus of the AB 
effect in relation to the locus of the PRP bottleneck. 
Anaipis of Tpnot repeated trials 
In light of the finding of an effect of stimulus repetition in this experiment it was of 
interest at this point to examine whether an effect of stimulus probability would be observed 
when only those triais classified as Tl-not repeated trials were anaiyzed. Thus, Ti-not repeated 
trials, i.e. triais on which the Tl letter was the sarne as the Ti letter on an imediately 
preceding trial, were excluded from the analysis. Hence, in this analysis, there are no repeated 
stimulus trials and therefore effects of immediate stimulus repetition have been removed. 
Ce11 rneans were calculated and entered in to an ANOVA with probability ( 1  : 4 : 9) and 
Tl-Ts lag ( 1 - 8) as variables. 
In cornparison to accuracy on Tl-absent triais (0.796), accuracy on identifjhg T2 on 
Tl-present trials was severely attenuated (0.689) F( 1,47) = 165.6, p < .0001, MS, = .004]. 
Insert Figure 8 about here 
When TI-present trials were andyzed separately a significant main effect of Tl-T2 lag 
was revealed [F(7, 329) = 33.1. p < .0001, MS, = .04]. This effect cm be seen in Figure 8. 
Accuracy on T-> was lowest when T2 appeared at iag 2 and improved steadily over 
subsequent lags reaching highest accuracy at Tr-Tz hg 7. 
Also there was a significant difference in accuracy on Tz as a function of the probability 
of presentation of the Tl  letter [F(2,  94) = 16.5, p c -000 1, MS, = .033]. Subjects 
demonstrated lowest accuracy on low probability trials, were intemediate for the probability 4 
condition, and accuracy was highest on triais associated with the highest probability Tl letter. 
(See Appendix D for Task2 accuracy for each level of pmbability at each TpT2 lag.) 
Contrary to the findings of the overall analysis (Analysis ofTask2 accuracy) in which 
al1 Tl-present trials were included, the interaction of probability and Ti-T2 lag only approached 
significance for Tl -not repeated trials [F( 14,658) = 1 -6, p < ,082, MS, = -03 11. The 
marginal statistical interaction here is likely due to the influence of noise on trials in the lower 
probability conditions. When al1 trials were included in the analysis, the probability 1 condition 
consisted of a maximum of 4 triais per TpT2 lag. per subject. This number is low in 
comparison to the probability 9 condition (<= 36 trials per Tl-T2 lag, per subject), but the 
inequality of trial number between the probability conditions is a necessity of the experimentai 
design. In the present analysis. in addition to the trials that may have k e n  eliminated because 
the response to Ti was not correct, and/or because of the RTl outlier procedure, the number of 
trials has been fbrther reduced due to the Tl-not repeated restriction. When the reduction in triai 
number was investigated it was found that the greatest reduction was in the probability 9 
condition which dmpped from an average of about 34 per subject when al1 the trials were 
included, to approximately 19 when only Tl-not repeated trials were analyzed. In the 
probability 4 condition the number of trials dropped fro.9 about 14 to 1 1, and in the probability 
1 condition, from an average of about 4 to 3. Evidence supporting the proposal that the 
strength of the interaction between probability and TpT2 lag is affected by the low number of 
trials representing the probability 1 condition, when the analysis is restricted to TI-not repeated 
triais, is provided by hirther, more detailed. examination of the interaction found in the initial 
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analysis, in which al1 trials were included (see Analyssis of Tusk2 uccuraq ). In this analysis 
the interaction of probability and Tl-T2 lag reached statistical significance when al1 probability 
conditions were included in the analysis @ c.026) but was not significant when the analysis 
was restricted to only the probability 1 and 4 conditions [F(7, 329) = 0.97, p c .46. MS, = 
.036]. When the probability conditions 4 and 9 were compared. they were found to be 
significantly different [F(7, 329) = 3.2. p c .002, MS, = .O1 I l ,  as was analysis of the 
probability 1 and 9 conditions F(7, 329) = 2.4, p c .O2 1. MS, = .033]. Cornparison of the 
data patterns in Figures 6 and 8, serves to show that the pattern of means for the overail 
analysis, when al1 trials were included and for the analysis of Tl-not repeated trials are very 
sirnilar, and that the effect of probability for Tl-not repeated trials is comparable to that 
observed over al1 trials. 
These results clearly show art AB effect for trials in which Ti was not the sarne on the 
preceding trial (Ti-not repeated). and this effect was modified by the probability of the Tl 
letter. Therefore, effects sirnilar to those found when al1 the experimental trials were entered in 
to the analysis were obtained using a data set restricted to those trials on which the Tl letter was 
not the sarne as on an immediately preceding trial. 
Task2 as a function of RT! 
The Cenual Interference Theory (Jolicoeur, 1999b) predicts that Taski response times 
should correlate with accuracy on Taskz. When Taski occupies central mechanisms for a long 
penod of time the AB effect should be larger than when those mechanisms are occupied for a 
shoner period of time. Also, the duration of processing when central mechanisms are occupied 
should be reflected in RTI. Consequently, long RTls should be correlated with poorer 
accuracy on Task2 and short RTls should correlate with an increase in Taskt accuracy, 
producing a smailer AB effect. This prediction can be tested by examining the AB effect as a 
function of RTl. 
However, one precaution must be taken here because it is possible that a correlation 
between RTi and T2 accuracy could reflect a change in performance over time, raîher thm a 
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causal effect tied to central processing. For example, if performance on Taski and Taskz 
improved as the experiment progressed. a relationship between RTl and T2 accuracy might be 
observed, as predicted by the Central Interference Theory. Subjects might be slower and less 
accurate at the beginning of the experiment simply because they are new to the tasks, and 
performance might improve over the course of the experiment as they become more expert at 
performing the tasks. Under these conditions, a correlation between RTl and Taski accuracy 
might be present, but only because slower responses made at the beginning of the experiment 
were coupled with poorer performance on Task2 at the same point in the experiment. The 
potential for determining whether a correlation between RTi and Taskî is a result of the 
fûndamental mechanism stated by the Central Interference Theory. or whether it is an artifact of 
practice, lies in examining RTl and Taskz performance for significant changes over trials. This 
can be accomplished by dividing the experimental trials into sections, representing progression 
through the experiment, and looking for a consistent AB effect correlationai relationship 
between RTl and Taskz performance across each section, rather than across the experiment as 
a whoie. 
Each subject's data was divided into four sets of trials, each corresponding to 168 
sequential experimental trials, making a total of 672 trials. These trials were then divided into 
cells representing TpTz lag. As the probability 1 and 4 conditions resulted in empty cells, 
because of too few observations, only the probability 9 condition was included. Each ce11 was 
subsequently sorted into two, depending on whether RTi was above or below the RTi ce11 
median. Mean accuracy in Task2 for each ce11 was caiculated and submitted to an M A  with 
Tl-T2 lag, short and long RTl, and trial set (first, second, third, and fourth) as within-subject 
factors. The overall means for short and long RTls and each Ti-T2 lag are shown in Figure 9. 
The analysis revealed an effect of trial set [F(3, 141) = 6.9, p > ,0002, MS, = .046]. 
Mean accuracy for Taskz was lower in the first trial set than in the other sets (Set 1 = 0.70; 2 = 
0.74; 3 = 0.74; 4 = 0.75). This effect was elirninated when the first set was not included in the 
analysis @ < S), thereby suggesting that performance on Task2 was poorer on the initial 168 
trials at the beginning of the experiment, in cornparison to performance throughout subsequent 
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trials. This difference may indicate chat subjects should have been given more practice pnor to 
the expenmentai trials. Most imponantly, the correlation between RTl and Taskz performance 
was consistent throughout the 4 sets of trials ihereby providing support for the Central 
Interference Theory. The pattern in the 4 via1 sets was similar to that shown in Figure 9 - long 
RTl s produced a larger AB effect than short RT 1 S. 
Insen Figure 9 about here 
Discussion 
Relative signal probability in Taski afîected the magnitude of the AB effect. Task 1 
stimuli presented less frequently produced a larger AB effect than signals presented more 
frequently. This outcome tells us that, in this experiment, the effect of probability is occumng 
at a stage of processing that is at, or before. the locus of the AB effect. 
An alternative explanation as to the effect of probability in Taski can be addressed at 
this point. If subjects were not performing the tasks according to the experimental instructions, 
and were guessing Tl in an attempt to perform well on T?, an effect of probability rnight be 
found for Ti. This is because, if subjects were guessing, the most frequent response would 
likely be the one associated with the highest probability Tl letter, the probability 9 condition. 
Thus, one rnight expect to see an effect of probability on Tl that is due to a guessing strategy, 
used to improve Task2 performance, rather than an effect of the probability manipulation. 
However, there is evidence in the results to suggest that this was not the case. Fintly, if 
subjects were guessing on Tl, and their most frequent response was the one associated with 
the highest probability Tl letter, accuracy on Tl should be high for the probability 9 condition 
but low for the other conditions. including the Tl-absent condition. The results show, 
however, that Tl accuracy was high across dl probability conditions as well as when Tl was 
absent (see Appendix A). In addition. if participants were guessing on Tl one would not expect 
to see an effect of probability on T2. Clearly. such an effect is present. 
Although the interaction of stimulus probability and TpT2 lag only approached 
significance @ c.082) when the analysis was limited to those triais in which the Tl-letter was 
not repeated on the immediately preceding trial, probability nevertheless modified the AB effect 
under these conditions. The effect of probability for Tl-not repeated trials was similar to the 
effect observed when dl trials were included in the analysis. Accuracy on Task2 declined as the 
probability of presentation of the Tl letter declined. 
Not only was the AB effect modified by varying signal probability, but stimulus 
repetition was also found to have an effect on Q accuracy. Stimuli repeated in succession are 
typically responded to faster and more accurately than non-repeated stimuli. The effect of 
repeating a stimulus on the magnitude of the AB was observed by sorting the data into trials on 
which the Ti letter was different from Tl on the immediately preceding trial, and triais where 
the Tl letter was the sarne as on the previous trial, and submitting these data sets to statistical 
analyses as before. Pashler and Johnston (1989) found, in an experiment designed to exhibit a 
PRP effect, that the effects of stimulus repetition were additive with SOA, suggesting that the 
locus of the repetition effect is at, or beyond. the PRP bottleneck. Similar findings of repetition 
effects found in the PRP experiments contained within this thesis are reponed later. 
The finding that stimulus repetition is a variable that affects the magnitude of the AB 
provides an additional resource to which the general procedure outlined within the objective of 
this thesis can be applied. At this point it is clear that both variables, stimulus probability and 
stimulus repetition, have an effect on the size of the AB and that the effects are therefore 
occurring at or before a locus of AB interference effect. It is possible now to use the sarne logic 
for stimulus repetition as originally applied to stimulus probability. Knowing these variables 
have an effect on the AB also makes it possible to use both variables in a PRP experimental 
design and apply the locus of cognitive slack logic to determine their effects in relation to the 
locus of the PRP bottieneck. 
Experiment 2 
Before determining whether stimulus probability and repetition effects are evident in a 
PRP design. we investigated whether such effects are observable in an AB experiment in 
which response to Tl is not speeded. Most studies investigating the AB effect have not used 
speeded Task 1 conditions (Raymond, et al., 1992; Shapiro et al.. 1994; Raymond, et al.. 
1995). Therefore, it seemed important to provide evidence that the AB effect could be 
demonstrated, using these variables, in a typical AB experimental paradigrn under unspeeded 
Taski conditions. In addition. if the data from a Taski unspeeded experiment was very 
different from Experiment 1, in which Taski was speeded, this might help to localize the 
effects of stimulus probability and stimulus repetition on T1 accuracy, thereby allowing us to 
establish more precisely a locus of the AB effect. Effects of stimulus probability and stimulus 
repetition in an unspeeded AB experiment would imply once again that the effect of these 
variables is occumng at. or before. the locus of the AB. In contrat, the observation of an AB 
effect unmodified by probability or stimulus repetition would ascertain that these effects, under 
Tl unspeeded conditions, are occumng independently of the AB effect, and consequently are 
located ai a stage of processing subsequent to the locus of the AB effect. Differential effects for 
both variables would suggest that the loci of these effects in relation to the locus of the AB 
effect are not the same. 
Method 
Subjects 
Seventy-seven undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo were paid a 
nominal arnount to participate in the study. Al1 subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. 
Procedure 
Method and procedure were the sarne as in Experiment 1 except that response to Ti was 
not speeded. Subjects were inswcted to wait untiI the end of the stimulus stream to make their 
responses to Tl and T2. A prompt appeared at the end of the RSVP stream "Did you see a red 
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H. O. or S or no red letter?". After making this response. by using the same response key 
assignment as in Experirnent 1, a similar prompt was given for the T2 response "Did you see 
and X or a Y?". After making both responses subjects pressed the space bar to initiate the next 
trial. 
Results 
Individual subject data was analyzed for accuracy on Task2 to ensure that al1 subjects 
could perform the task of identifying when no Tl letter was present. Twenty-nine individuais 
who failed to perform at or above 69% accuracy on Taskî, on TI-absent triais where Taski 
was correct, were eliminated from the data set. There were 48 subjects in this final data set. 
Analvsis of Taskl accuracy 
For Task 1 there was a main effect of probability [F(2.94) = 7.3, p > .ûO 1, MS, = 
.O251 in that accuracy was supenor in the probability 9 condition and poorest in the probability 
1 condition. (See Appendix E for accuracy rates for each level of probability at each Ti-T2 lag.) 
Analysis of Task2 accuracy 
Those trials on which the response to Taskl was correct were analyzed for accuracy on 
Taskt. As in Experirnent 1, accuracy for Task2 on Ti-present trials was severely attenuated 
(0.694) in cornparison to performance on trials where Ti was absent (0.828) [ F ( l .  47) = 
130.1. p < .O00 1. MS, = .O 151. For Tl-present trials ce11 means for accuracy on Task2 with 
probability of (1: 4 : 9) and TpT2 Iag (1 - 8) as variables were caiculated and entered into an 
ANOVA. Results are shown in Figure 10. 
Main effects of probability [F(2.  94) = 35.8. p c .O00 1. MS, = .032], and T 1-T2 lag 
[F(7, 329) = 17.5. p < ,000 1. MS, = .O361 were again evident. and an interaction between 
these variables approached significance [F(14.658) = 1.6, p > .07, MS, = .026]. A larger 
AB effect was observed for the TI letter associated with the lowest frequency (probability 1). 
and the smallest effect was seen for the probability 9 condition, while performance for the 
probability 4 condition was between the other two. When T2 appeared at TI-T? Iag 1, the 
average accuracy across al1 three probability conditions was 0.7 15, dropping to 0.598 at Ti -T2 
lag 2. Performance progressively improved across the subsequent Ti-T2 lags except in the 
probability 1 condition where it dropped at Ti-T2 lag 4, climbing sharply to equal that of the 
probability 4 condition at TpT2 Iag 5. The interaction of probability and TpT2 lag was further 
examined to see whether there was a contribution of noise from the probability 1 condition that 
was possibly weakening the interaction. When the analysis was restricted to the probability 4 
and 9 conditions statistical significance remained marginal @ > .07). The effect was only 
significant when the probability 1 and 9 conditions were compared [F(7,329) = 2.1, p > .04, 
MS, = .034], suggesting that the number of trials in the probability 1 and 4 conditions was 
limiting the ability to detect a strong interaction between probability and TI-T2 lag. (See 
Appendix F for accuracy rates for each probability at each TpT2 lag.) 
Analysis of Tpnot repeated and Tprepeared triah 
Using trials from the probability 9 condition, the effect of Ti-T2 lag was evaluated for 
trials on which the sarne Tl letter had appeared on the previous trial (Ti-repeated trials) and 
compared to those triais on which the Tl letter was different (Ti-not mpeated). 
Insen Figure 1 1 about here 
A cornparison of Tl-not repeated Tl -repeated trials in the probability 9 condition can be 
seen in Figure 1 1. In contrat to the speeded version of this AB experiment a significant 
difference in Task2 accuracy was observed between Ti  -repeated and Tl  -not repeated trials 
[F( 1,47) = 17.3. p > ,000 1 ,  MS, = .O 1 11. Subjects were more accurate on trials on which 
the Ti stimulus had been repeated than on Tl-not repeated trials. 
The pattern of data across the Tl -T2 lags is very similar for T 1 -not repeated and T 1 - 
repeated trials and there is a significant effect of Tl-Tz lag [F(7.329) = 14.8, p < .0001, MS, 
= .O 191. However, as in Experiment 1. there is no interaction between Tl-not repeated / Tl- 
repeated and Tl-Tz lag [F(7,329) = 1.2, p < -27, MS, = .009]. Accuracy on T2 declined 
drarnatically when T2 was presented at TpT2 lag 2. irnproving across the remaining Tl-T2 lags 
and reaching maximum accuracy at Ti-T2 lag 8. (See Appendix G for accuracy rates for each 
TpT2 lag for T 1-not repeated and Ti-repeated trials.) 
To examine further whether there was a difference in the size of the AB effect between 
Tl -not repeated and T 1 -repeated trials the difference at the shoner T 1 -T2 lags was compared to 
the difference at the longer T 1 -T2 lags. The difference between Tl -T2 lags 1 - 4 and T 1 -T2 lags 
5 - 8, for Tl-not repeated and Ti-repeated trials, for each subject were calculated, yielding 
means of these scores for short and long Tl-T2 lags. Like Experiment 1, the difference 
between these means was statistically significant [ F ( l ,  47) = 4.1, p < .050. MS, = .ûû5], 
showing a small, but reliable decrease in the sUe of the AB when Tl was repeated across 
consecutive trials. 
Analysis of Tpnot repeated trials 
The effects of stimulus probability and Tl-Tz lag were evaluated for triais where the Tl 
letter was the first in a sequence of sarne-Tl trials or was followed by an dtemate Tl letter (TI- 
not repeated). Hence, as in Expriment 1, only those trials on which the T I  letter was different 
from the Tl letter on the immediately preceding trial were analyzed. 
Insert Figure 12 about here 
Figure 12 shows the data for the T 1 - absent and T 1 -present trials. Accuracy on 
identifying T2 on Tl-present trials was severely attenuated (0.68 1 ) in comparison to 
performance on TI-absent trials (0.8 l7)trials [F( 1,47) = 13 1.3. p < .ûûûl, MS, = -01 71. 
In an analysis of Tl-present trials a probability effect (F(2.94) = 23.7, p < .0001, 
MS, = .038], and an effect of Tl-T2 lag [F(7,329) = 19.5 p < .0001, MS, = .O381 were 
observed but the interaction between these variables failed to reach significance [F(14,658) = 
1.46, p > .12, MS, = .O3 11. Accuracy on T2 showed the greatest overall attenuation for 
probability 1 trials, followed by probability 4, and was highest in the probability 9 condition. 
The effect of Ti-T? lag can be seen in the drarnatic drop in Taskz accuracy when T2 appeared at 
lags 2 and 3 compared to lag 1, and the subsequent steady improvement over the rernaining TI -
T2 lags. The probability 1 condition deviated a little from this pattern showing poorest 
performance at TpT2 lag 4. (See Appendix H for accuracy rates on Task2 for each probability 
level and TI-T2 lag.) 
As in Experiment 1, there was a large reduction in the number of triais per condition for 
this analysis. In the probability 9 condition the number of triais was reduced from about 34 per 
subject to about 20. In the probability 4 condition the number dropped from an average of 
approximately 15 to 12, and in the probability 1 condition from about 4 to 3. The lack of an 
interaction between probability and Ti-T2 lag for the Ti-not repeated trials is likely due to the 
influence of noise caused by the reduction in the number of trials per TpT2 lag, especiaily in 
the probability 1 condition where the number of trials was already low before the Ti-not 
repeated limitation was applied. 
Discussion 
in this unspeeded AB paradigm. stimulus probability and stimulus repetition modified 
the size of the AB effect. As the probability of a stimulus increased. the magnitude of the AB 
decreased. This effect was also evident when Tl-repeated trials were removed from the data set 
leaving only those trials on which the Ti letter was not the sarne as the Ti letter on the previous 
trial. In addition to the effects of signal probability, the size of the AB effect decreased slightly. 
but significantly, for repeated stimuli in cornparison to non-repeated stimuli in the probability 9 
condition. 
Clearly, there is ;in effect of signal probability observed in performance judging a T2 
letter when it follows a Tl letter presented in an RSVP Stream in an AB experimental paradigrn. 
The effect of probability is apparent when Taski is speeded (Experiment 1) and when it is 
unspeeded (Experiment 2). The conclusion is that the probability effect in Taski is occurring 
at, or before. a stage of processing responsible for the AB effect regardless of whether Taski is 
speeded or unspeeded. 
Stimulus repetition also modified the AB effect. under speeded imd unspeeded Tl  
conditions. though this effect was stronger when Taskl did not entai1 a speeded response 
(speeded = p > .024; unspeeded = p ç .050). In the probability 9 condition. a Tl letter that 
was the same as the Tl letter on an immediately preceding trial produced less of an interference 
effect than a different Tl letter. Thus, a conclusion similar to that given for stimulus probability 
can be applied to stimulus repetition. The effect of stimulus repetition must be occumng at, or 
before, the locus of the AB effect. 
Experiment 3 
Experiments 1 and 2 determined that the effects of relative signal probability and 
stimulus repetition are occumng at. or before, the locus of the AB effect in Taski speeded and 
unspeeded AB paradigms. We now wish to discover the locus of these effects in relation to the 
PRP bottleneck. According to the locus of cognitive slack logic. an additive pattern to the 
results would indicate that the effects are occurrîng at or beyond the PRP bottieneck, while 
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underadditivity would be indicative of a locus at a stage of processing before the PRP 
bottleneck. Overadditivity. on the other hand. would suggest a capacity sharing mode1 rather 
than a postponement mode1 of information processing. 
Method 
Subjects 
24 undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo were paid a nominal 
amount to pmicipate in the study. Al1 subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The 
expenment was run on a SVGA colour computer screen controlled by a 384,486, or 586 
CPU. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli were auditory tones and upper-case letters. The tones were of frequencies 400 
Hz, 1000 Hz and 2500 Hz and were presented using the intemal speaker of the computer. The 
letters were H, 0, and S, approximateiy 0.80 x I O ,  presented in the centre of the screen in white 
on a black background. 
Procedure 
Each trial began with the presentation of one of the tones (S 1). for a duration of 100 
ms. followed by the visual presentation of one of the letters W). The letter remained on the 
screen until a response had k e n  made. The SOA between the tone and the letter was varied and 
could be either 50 ms, 200 ms, 450 ms, or 800 ms. A probability variable was associated with 
the letter stimulus. The relative probability of each letter was 1: 4: 9 meaning that, within every 
14 trials one letter (e.g., H) was presented 9 times, another letter (e.g., 0) was presented 4 
times, while the remaining lener (e.g., S) was presented once. The probability level assigned to 
each letter was counterbalanced across subjects so that, for every 6 subjects, al1 combinations 
of letten and probability levels were used once. Each complete crossing of SOA, letter (1 : 4 : 
9), and tones. was repeated 4 times to make a total of 672 trials that were divided equally 
between 4 blocks. The experirnentai triais were preceded by 1 block of 48 practice trials. 
At the beginning of the experimental session subjects read instructions regarding the 
procedure and were subsequently instructed verbally on the same matter. The first !ask (Taski) 
was to identify the tone (low. medium, or high). The second task (Taskz) was to identify the 
letter (H, O, or S). Reaction time to both stimuli was recorded and responses to the tone and 
the letter were made by pressing assigned keyboard keys. The assigned keys for the tones were 
as follows: z for low tone (400 Hz); x for medium tone (1000 Hz); c for high tone (2500 Hz). 
For the letters they were: .< for H; .> for 0; I? for S. The left hand was used to respond to 
the tone and the right hand to respond to the letter. After each trial (except the last trial in each 
block) feedback was given, in the form of adjacent plus andor minus signs, as to whether the 
Taskl and Taskz had been responded to correctly or incorrectly. The sign on the left referred to 
Taski and the one on the right to Taskz. These feedback symbols also served as a fixation 
point for the upcoming trial. Each trial was initiated by pressing the space bar, which caused 
the fixation symbols to disappear, and the trial to begin 750 ms later. 
Results 
Only triais on which responses to Taski and Task2 were correct were used in the 
analyses. Response times were screened for outlien in each ce11 for each subject using a 
modified version of the procedure described by Van Selst and Jolicoeur (1994). Percent 
rejected were 2.74 for Taski and 1.8% for Task2. 
Analysis of Taskl response times and accuracy 
Ce11 means for reaction time for Taski with signal probability (1 : 4: 9) and SOA 
(50/200/450/800 ms) as variables were calculated and entered in to an ANOVA. Significant 
main effects of probability [F(2,46) = 3.7, p < -034, MS, = 6980.541, and SOA [F(3,69) = 
3.4, p < .023, MS, = 392 1.471 were evident. As can be seen in Figure 13 (dashed lines), the 
effect of probability was strongest at the shortest SOA. Also, at the shortest SOA, and at al1 
levels of probability, except the probability 9 condition, mean response time to Si was longer 
than at any other SOA. In general, RTl increased linearly as SOA increased from 200 ms to 
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800 ms. except for the probability 1 condition where RTi was faster at the 200 ms and 450 ms 
SOAs than at the 800 ms SOA. The effects of probability and SOA in Taski were eliminated 
when the 50 ms SOA was not included in the analysis. (See Appendix 1 for mean reaction time 
for each Ievel of probability and SOA for Task 1 .) 
Error rates indicated a main effect of SOA [F(3 .69)  = 9.0. p < .O00 1, MS, = .002]. 
Error rates were slightly higher at the shorter SOAs (50 ms and 200 ms) than at the longer 
SOAs (450 ms and 800 ms). (See Appendix 1 for mean error rates for each level of probability 
and SOA for Tas k 1 .) 
Insert Figure 13 about here 
Analysis of Task~ response tirne and accuracy 
A similar analysis was performed on mean response times for Taskz. Figure 13 (solid 
Iines) shows the mean response time for each SOA and each probability level. A significant 
effect of signal probability was revealed [F(2,46) = 28.0, p < .0001, MS, = 19776.991. 
Subjects were faster to respond to the letter that was most likely to appear (probability 9) and 
were slowest in responding to the Ietter that was least likely to appear (probability 1). An effect 
of SOA was also evident, response tirnes decreasing as SOA increased, providing clear 
evidence of a PRP effect [F(3,69) = 455.0, p < .ûûû1, MS, = 7863.2 11. The efiect of 
probability was additive across SOAs with no hint of an interaction [F(6, 138) = 0.5, p > 
0.785, MS, = 5333.6291. Although there was a slight fanning out of the means at the longest 
SOA this effect was no where near king statistically significant. (See Appendix J for rnean 
response times for each level of probability and each SOA for Task2.) 
Percentage of errors for Task2 was highest for the probability 1 condition (0.1 16) and 
lowest for the probability 9 condition (0.041). with the probability 4 condition intermediate 
between the iwo (0.103) rF(2.46) = 18.0, p < .O00 1, MS, = .008]. No effect of SOA was 
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evident [ F ( 3 . 6 9 )  = 1 . 1 .  p < .37 1. MS, = .003]. (See Appendix J for mean error rates for 
each level of probability and SOA for Task2.) 
Analvsis of S2-not repeated and $-repeated trials 
In addition, in the probability 9 condition. RT2s for those trials on which the letter was 
the same as on the previous trial (S2-repeated) were compared to trials where the letter on the 
preceding trial was different (Sz-not repeated). 
Lnsert Figure 14 about here 
------------------------------------- 
Figure 14 shows a PRP effect for both triai types that is additive with SOA (F (3.69) = 
1.1, p > .342, MS, = 3205.5 1 11. Reaction time increased as SOA decreased [F(3,69) = 
765.1, p < ,0001, MS, = 3278.8851, and S2-repeated trials were faster than S2-not repeated 
trials [F(1,23) = 42.07. p c .0001, MS, = 4723.6451. (See Appendix K for mean response 
times for al1 levels of probability and SOA.) 
Analysis of S2-not repeated tn'als 
As in the AB experiments, the effect of stimulus probability was investigated for trials 
on which the target stimulus was not the sarne as on the imrnediately preceding trial. Trials on 
which the Sa-letter was not the sarne as the letter on an imrnediately preceding trial ( S ~ n o t  
repeated) were entered in to an ANOVA with probability and SOA as within-subject factors. 
The results can be seen in Figure 15. 
A significant effect of SOA was evident [F(3 ,  69) = 358.3, p < .O00 1, MS, = 
10330.2071 in that mean response time to Taskz decreased as SOA increased. In addition there 
was a significant effect of probability [F(2,46) = 14.0, p < .O 1, MS, = 2 18 12.3 11 which 
was additive with SOA [F(6, 138) = 0.7, p < 569, MS, = 6939.3 11. Letters that were 
presented most frequently were responded to faster than those presented least frequently. while 
the mean response time to letters in the probability 4 condition was intermediate between the 
other two probability conditions. (See Appendix L for mean response times for al1 levels of 
probability and SOA.) 
Discussion 
In this PRP experiment two tasks were performed in close succession to each other and 
performance on Taskl was significantly affected by the temporal proximity of the two stimuli 
associated with those tasks (SI and S2). Stimulus-onset asynchrony was varied and, as SOA 
decreased, mean response tirne in the second task increased. This pattern of results clearly 
demonstrates a classic PRP effect (Pashler, 1994b). According to the postponement account of 
PRP interference, interference in processing the second of two stimuli results from the inability 
of the processing system to accornrnodate concurrent processing when processing is common 
to more than one task. When two tasks require the same processing cesources, processing 
necessary for the second task must wait until processing of the first task is complete, and thus, 
a processing bottleneck exists. When SOA is short, the degree of task overlap is greater than 
when SOA is long, and processing necessary for the second task can begin earlier. 
Nevertheless, Task2 processing will be intempted at the processing bottleneck resulting in a 
'wait' period, or pei-iod of cognitive slack (McCann & Johnston, 1992). and a slowing in 
Task2 responses. In Experiment 3 processing the auditory tone, the fist  task, interfered with 
the second task of identiQing a letter, and resulted in a slowing of response times to the letter 
as SOA decreased. 
In addition to the effect of SOA, this study clearly showed an effect of signal 
probability. Response times were longer to Taskz stimuli, letters, that were presented less 
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frequently than to letters presented more frequently, and this effect was additive with SOA. As 
SOA decreased. RT2 increased by about the sarne amount across al1 probability levels. 
According to the locus of cognitive slack logic. an additive pattern such as this indicates that the 
variable, in this case stimulus probability, is having an effect at. or beyond, the PRP 
bottleneck. If the effect of stimulus probability were occumng pnor to the bottleneck stage, 
Task2 response ::mes should have produced an underadditive interaction of probability and 
SOA, as SOA was reduced. Any increase in the duration of a processing stage pnor to the 
bottleneck would be absorbed in the period of cognitive slack. 
The results from Experiment 3 indicate that the locus of the probability effect is either 
at, or later than, the locus of the PRP bottleneck and we found a similar effect of probability 
when the S2-repeated trials were removed from the data set. When those trials on which the Sz 
letter was not the sarne as the S2 letter on the previous trial were analyzed separately, the effect 
of probability was again observed to be additive with SOA. Thus, as found in the AB 
experiments, the effect of probability in this experiment was not only a function of repeating 
the stimulus on sequential trials. but was an effect brought about by the frequency of 
presentation associated with a stimulus spanning multiple trials. 
In this study we also found an effect of stimulus repetition. Mean response time to an 
S? stimulus that was the sarne as  the stimulus on an irnmediately preceding trial, was faster 
than mean response time to a stimulus that was different. Like stimulus probability, the effect 
of stimulus repetition was additive with SOA, indicating that the locus of this effect is also at, 
or after, the PRP bottleneck. 
Experirnent 3 demonstrated that the locus (i) of the effect of two variables, stimulus 
probability and stimulus repetition, is at, or after, the PRP bottieneck. Evidence in the PRP 
literature strongly suggests that the PRP bottleneck is located at a late stage of information 
processing, probabl y response selection (McCann Br Johnston, 1992; Schubert, 1999; Van 
Selst & Jolicoeur, 1997). Thus, the data provided by this PRP experiment leads to the 
inference that the locus(i) of stimulus probability, and of stimulus repetition, is at, or after, the 
stage of response selection. The implication of this interpretation with respect to the locus of 
the AB effect will be discussed later. 
Under a simple postponement theory it is usually assumed that performance on Taskl 
should be unaffected by the temporal proximity of S 1 and S2 (Pashler, 1994b). Contrary to this 
supposition however, the effect of SOA affected reaction time to the auditory tone (S 1) in 
Experiment 3. In the probability 4 and 9 conditions, at the three longest SOAs, the effect of 
SOA on reaction time to S 1 is seen as a slowing in response to S 1 as SOA increases. In the 
probability 1 condition, RTl is faster at the two intemediate SOAs than at the longest SOA. At 
the shortest SOA the pattern was slightly different. In the probability 1 and 4 conditions, 
subjects were slowest in responding to S 1 at the 50 ms SOA, but in the probability 9 condition 
they were slowest at the longest SOA. The general pattern of RTi slowing with increasing 
SOA could possibly result from subjects grouping SI and S2 responses on some trials, rather 
than responding to the first stimulus independent of the second stimulus. This strategy would 
entail saving the first response until the second response is selected and would result in a 
slowing of RTl that is correlated with the time between onset of the two stimuli, increasing as 
SOA increases (Pashler, 1984). 
The effects on RTi in this experiment are small, and not unusual in PRP data. Possible 
explanations might exist (e-g., grouping, see Pashler & Johnston, 1989) but, at preseni, the 
cause of the specific effects of Task2 manipulations on Taski performance in Experiment 3 are 
unclear. The results of interest in Experiment 3 are those from Task2 and, though effects on 
Taski were found in the data, these effects were very much smaller than those in Taskz as 
demanded by a postponement account. Thus it seems reasonably safe to focus the analysis on 
the results from Task2. 
However, because of the influence of SOA on RTi in the present experiment, it seems 
appropriate to discuss the capacity sharing account of the PRP effect. Capacity sharing 
predicü, not only that the effect of SOA should be relatively equal across Taski and Tash  but 
also that the effect should be in the same direction for both tasks. According to this account, 
processing resources are shared and performance on both tasks is affected by task overlap. 
68 
Consequently, reaction time for Taski and Task2 should decrease as the time between the 
corresponding stimuli increases. Clearly this pattern is demonstrated for Taskz in Experiment 3 
but the effect of SOA on Taski is counter to the capaciiy sharing prediction. in general, Taski 
reaction time increased as SOA increased at ail but the shortest SOA (50 rns). The observation 
that RT1 increased with increasing SOA, does not suppon the capacity sharing account of 
information processing. 
It should be noted that the percentage of erron on Taski decreased as reaction time 
slowed suggesting the presence of a speed-accuracy trade-off. As subjects responded more 
quickly in Taski they in Nni cornrnitted more errors. In Task2 there is no effect of SOA on 
errors, indicating that accuracy across SOAs was not affected by subjects' speed of response. 
Experiment 4 
Although the results from Experiment 3 provide no statistical indication of an 
interaction between probability and SOA (F cl), Taskz performance at the longest SOA (800 
ms), in the probability 9 condition, appeared to deviate slightly from strict additivity. There is a 
larger RT2 difference between each probability level at this SOA than at other SOAs. To be 
certain that this pattem was not indicative of weak underadditivity that we might have failed to 
detect, Experiment 4 was conducted. The question we need to address is whether this data tmly 
reflects additivity or whether it suggests an underadditive interaction of stimulus probability 
with decreasing SOA. One explanation for the siight deviation fiom additivity at the longest 
SOA is the possibility that this data point represents a state of over-preparation. Subjects are 
likely expecting, and are conceivably more prepared, for the most frequently presented 
stimulus. Accuracy is not affected (.95), but the longer SOA (800 ms) provides adequate time 
to prepare a response and may result in a state of over-preparation, manifest as a 
disproportionate decrease in reaction time. In light of this pssibility it would be of interest to 
observe the data pattern under conditions where the longest SOA is longer than 800 m. In 
addition, we decided to add a large proportion of catch trials, in which no S2 was presented. 
This modification to Experiment 3 would hopefully discourage subjects from over-preparing 
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their response to the most likely trial stimulus. With the addition of these S2-absent trials it was 
hoped that subjects would wait for S2 and process it in an unbiased way rather than anticipating 
the most frequent S r .  The addition of S?-absent trials would also serve to equate the PRP 
experiments with the AB experimental design in which Tl-absent trials were included as 
control trials in the AB experirnents. 
Method 
Method and procedure for Experiment 4 were similar to those of Experiment 3. 
Subjects 
Twenty-four undergraduate students from the University of Waterloo were paid a 
nominal amount to participate in the snidy. All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. 
Stimuli 
Stimuli for Taski were identical to those used in Experiment 3. 
Procedure 
Modifications to the design were as follows. In addition to the SOAs used in 
Experiment 3, a 1200 ms condition was included. Also, a condition in which there was no S2 
letter was added. On half the triais an S2 letter. H. O. or S. was presented (S2-present trials). 
The remainder of the trials were S2-absent trials. The relative probability (1: 4: 9) associated 
with each letter was counterbaianced, as before, between subjects. On the S2-present trials, 
subjects responded using the appropriate keyboard keys, which were the sarne as those 
assigned in Experiment 3. On S2-absent trials, an audible 'chirp' sound was presented at 1600 
ms SOA to inform the subject that no letter would appear and that they should press the 
spacebar to continue to the next trial. The 'chirp' sound was created by presenting a sequence 
of four 50 ms tones (632 Hz, 158 1 Hz, 632 Hz, and 158 1 Hz). Reaction times for Taski were 
recorded on every trial. and for Task2 on the S2-present trials. 
Because of the addition of the S2-absent condition and the 1200 rns SOA condition, the 
number of trials increased, from 672 in Experiment 3 to 1260 in the present expriment. Due to 
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the length of this expenment. the trials were divided into two sessions and run over two days. 
In the first session subjects participated in a pnctice block of Iûû trials. This practice session 
was followed by 4 blocks of experimental trials each block consisting of 105 trials. In the 
second session. on day two. the practice black was reduced to 40 trials and was followed by 8 
blocks of experimental trials. 105 trials in each. making a total of 1260 experimental triais nin 
over the course of the two sessions. 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 3 except that subjects were informed that on 
some trials the second stimulus (lener) would not be presented and in those cases they would 
hear a 'chirp' sound at which time they were to press the space bar. To minirnize the chance of 
subjects waiting for the chirp rather than preparing for a possible response, which might be 
particularly likely at the longest SOA (1200 ms), subjects were instructed to be prepared to 
respond to a letter right up until they heard the 'chirp' sound. 
Note that the most frequent type of trial in this experiment was the S2-absent trial, 
which occurred on 50% of the trials. If subjects tend to over-prepare the most frequent 
response they would prepare the response with the spacebar rather than to one of the critical S2 
target letters. 
Results 
Response time outiiers for correct responses on both tasks were removed from the data 
set in a sirnilar fashion to Experiment 3. Percent rejected was 2.44 for Taski and 1.6% for 
Taskz. 
Analysis of Taski response tirne and accuracy 
Ce11 means for reaction time to Taski with signai probability in Task2 (1 : 4: 9) and SOA 
(50/200/450/800/1200 rns) as variables were calculated and entered in to an ANOVA. 
Significantly slower response times at the shorter SOAs (50 ms and 200 ms) were responsible 
for the effect of SOA in Taski [F(4,92) = 3 1.8, p c .ûûûl, MS, = 4418.8731. This pattern 
can be seen in Figure 16. There was no effect of signal probability rF(2.46) = 1.1, p > .33, 
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MS, = 3729.9681 and no interaction of probability and SOA [F(8.  184) = 1.3. p < .248, MS, 
= 3342.2011. (See Appendix M for mean reaction time for each level of probability and SOA 
for Task 1 ,) 
For Task 1, no main effects in the error data were evident. (See Appendix M for mean 
error rates for each level of probability and SOA for Task 1 .) 
Overall accuracy on S2-absent trials was 99.80% and the mean response tirne for S 1, 
when S2 was absent. was 590 ms. 
Insert Figure 16 about here 
Anabis of Taskz response time and accuraq 
A similar analysis was performed on rnean response times for Task2, the outcome of 
which cm be seen in Figure 16. Significant effects of probability [F(2,46)  = 34.2, p < .0001, 
MS, = 9004.9721, and SOA [F(4,92) = 252.1. p < ,000 1. MS, = 1 16 19.4031 were found, 
with no evidence of an interaction between these variables [F(8, 184) = 0.82, p c 0.583, MS, 
= 36 1 8.9791. Mean reaction time to the letter presented most frequently (probability 9) was 
significantly faster than response time to the lowest probability letter. Mean reaction time in the 
probability 4 condition was intermediate between the probability 1 and 9 conditions. Overall 
RT2 decreased as SOA increased, king slowest at the shortest SOA and fastest at the longest 
SOA, although at 800 ms and 1200 ms SOAs, RT2 was almost equivalent across the 
probability 4 and 9 conditions. (See Appendix N for mean reaction time for each level of 
probability and SOA for Task2.) 
Only a main effect of probability was evident when the mean error rates were analyzed 
[F(2,46) = 1 1.12, p > .O00 1, MS, = .O 121. Highest accuracy was on trials that made up the 
probability 9 condition, followed by the probability 4 condition, and subjects were least 
accurate in the probability 1 condition. (See Appendix N for mean error rates for each levei of 
probability and SOA for Task2,) 
Analysis of S2-not repeated and S2-repeated trials 
As shown in Figure 17, cornparison of triais, in the probability 9 condition, on which 
the S2 letter was not the same as the letter on the previous trial (S2-not repeated), and trials on 
which the S2 letter was the same (S~repeated), revealed, as in Experiment 3, that S2-repeated 
trials were significantly faster than Sz-not repeated [F( 1, 23) = 17.3, p < .ûû04, MS, = 
5282.0481 and that a significant effect of SOA was present [F(4,92) = 309.9, p < .ûûû 1, MS, 
= 6 189.9661. Overall performance was slowest at the shortest SOA and fastest at the longest 
SOA, and this pattern for both trial types was additive across SOAs [F(4,92) = 1 .O, p > .40, 
MS, = 2007.60 11. (See Appendix O for mean response times for S2-not repeated and S2- 
repeated trials for each SOA in the probability 9 condition.) 
Insert Figure 17 about here 
Analysis of S2-not repeated 
Effects of probability and SOA were calculated for trials on which the S2 letter was not 
the same as presented on an imrnediately preceding trial. 
Main effects of probability [F(2,46) = 25.7, p < .ûûû1, MS, = 9123.9741, and SOA 
[F(4,92) =249.1, p < ,000 1, MS, = 1 1257.4361 were found for these S2-not repeated trials. 
The effect of probability was additive with SOA [F(8, 184) = 0.8, p < 569, MS, = 
363 1.7941, as can be seen in Figure 18. RT2 was relatively equal for the 800 ms and 1200 ms 
SOAs across the probability 4 and 9 conditions. (See Appendix P for mean response times for 
each level of probability for each SOA.) 
Insert Figure 18 about here 
Discussion 
In this experiment stimulus probability produced similar effects to those found in 
Experiment 3. Mean response time in Taskl was shortest for the probability condition in which 
S2, the letter. was presented most frequently, and slowest in the condition in which the letter 
was presented least frequently. Most importantly, effects of stimulus probability were additive 
with SOA showing that stimulus probability was having an effect at a stage of processing at, or 
beyond, the PRP bottleneck. 
The 1200 ms SOA was added in this experiment to ascertain whether or not subjects 
reached asymptote in their performance on Tas- at the 800 ms SOA. In the probability 4 and 9 
conditions, response times were no different when SOA was 1200 ms than when SOA was 
800 rns. The absence of any hint of a statistical interaction between probability and SOA 
suggests that the deviation from strict additivity in Expriment 3 was probably due to 
measurement error. The relatively flat RT2s across the 800 and 1200 ms SOA conditions in 
Experiment 4 suggest that performance was near asymptote levels in the 800 ms condition. 
Thus, in Experiments 3 and 4, the absence of a significant interaction between probability and 
SOA could not have ken due to a failure to test performance at an SOA producing near 
asymptote RT2 as required by a postponement mode1 of interference. The results of Experiment 
4 converge nicely with those of Experiment 3 in showing the effects of probability of S2 are 
additive with SOA. 
In this experiment, as in the other experiments reported here, the effect of signal 
probability continued to be evident, and additive with SOA, when the S p o t  repeaied trials 
were analyzed separately. The effect of signal probability for Sgnot repeated trials was simiiar 
to the effect found when ail triais were included in the analysis, in that mean response time was 
shortest for the most frequently presented Sz letter (probability 9 condition) and longest for 
trials on which the least probable stimulus was presented (probability 1 condition). 
The effect of stimulus repetition found in the present study can also be interpreted in the 
context of the locus of cognitive slack logic. Mean response tirne to a stimulus that was 
repeated on the previous trial was shorter than mean response time to a stimulus that was not 
repeated, with no interaction of stimulus repetition and SOA (F cl) .  As with stimulus 
probability, the effect of stimulus repetition was additive with SOA and, according to the locus 
of cognitive slack logic, must therefore be occumng at a stage of processing at, or beyond, the 
PRP bottleneck. 
Therefore, like Experiment 3, we have identified two variables in this PRP experiment 
that show additive effects with SOA. Interpreting these effects using the locus of cognitive 
slack logic, leads us to conclude that the locus(i) of the effects of these variables is at, or later 
than, the locus of the PRP bottleneck. This information can be combined with the results from 
the AB experiments to help detemine the locus of the AB effect. The contribution of the results 
from the AB and PRP experiments toward finding the locus of the AB effect will be discussed 
in more detail shortly. 
Also in Experiment 4, as in Experiment 3, an effect of Soi? on Taski response times 
was present. This effect was entirely due to the contribution of the two shortest SOAs (50 and 
200 ms). There was no difference in RTl at longer SOAs (4501800/12ûû ms), but at the shorter 
SO As (501200 ms) RT 1 increased as S OA decreased. As discussed under Experiment 3, one 
possibility for seeing effects of Task2 variables on Taski is that subjects may group their S 1 
and S2 responses on some trials. For exarnple, when the temporal interval between two stimuli 
requinng speeded responses is very short, subjects may hold off on responding to S 1 until they 
are also ready to respond to S2. Under these conditions Taski response times could show 
effects of SOA like those found for Task;?. As stated dready, the effects on RTl in this 
expenment, and in Experiment 3, are small, and do not warrant senous concem regarding the 
effects of pnmary interest in these snidies, namely those associated with Task;?. 
General Discussion 
The research ernbodied within this thesis was designed to explore the locus(i) of a dual- 
task interference effect known as the Attentional Blink. The goal was to establish a locus of the 
AB effect, in relation to the PRP bottleneck, by performing manipulations in both paradigrns 
(AB and PRP) and by using rnethods of analysis that provide constraints on the locuslloci of 
factor effects. 
Relative signal probability produced the appropriate effects in both AB and PRP 
experimental designs. Probability of Tl affected the size of the AB effect (Exps. 1 & 2). As the 
probability of presentation of a TI letter decreased. accuracy on identibing T2 decreased, 
thereby increasing the size of the AB effect. In the PRP experiments (Exps. 3 & 4) a sirnilar 
effect was reflected in reaction tirne to the second of two stimuli. As stimulus probability 
increased reaction time to S2 decreased. 
In the PRP experiments. the effect of varying the probability of S2 was additive across 
SOA. According to the locus of cognitive slack logic (McCann & Johnston, 1992; Pashler, 
1984; Pashler & Johnston, 1989) an additive pattern means that none of the effect of varying 
stimulus probability was absorbed in the period of cognitive slack, and that the effect therefore 
occurred at a stage of processing after the cognitive slack period. 
The effect of relative signal probability was evident in the .AB experirnents, both when 
Taski was speeded and when it was unspeeded. The finding that the probability of Tl affected 
the size of the AB indicates that the effect of probability must have occurred at, or prior to, the 
locus of the AB effect. If the locus of stimulus probability was subsequent to the locus of the 
AB effect then no such effect wouId have been seen. 
The results of the PRP and AB experiments and the interpretation of the effect of 
stimulus probability in relation to the loci of the PRP and AB bottlenecks constrain a locus of 
the AB effect in relation to the PRP bottleneck. if stimulus probability is having an effect a4 or 
beyond the PRP bottleneck, and at, or before the locus of the AB effect, then, at least one stage 
of processing involved in the AB effect must be iocated at, or beyond, the PRP bottleneck. 
Locus(i) of the PRP Effecf 
Several studies have provided empirical evidence, by varying stimulus frequency, 
supporting a locus of the effect of frequency at. or after. a PRP response selection bottleneck. 
Pashler & Johsnton ( 1989) for exarnple, using a PRP paradigm, found additive effects of 
stimulus repetition with SOA, underadditive effects of contrast with decreasing SOA, and no 
interaction between the two variables. These results show that the stages at which stimulus 
contrast and stimulus repetition have their effects are not one and the same. The former must be 
having an effect before the locus of the PRP bottleneck. whereas the effect of the latter must be 
ai, or beyond, the bottleneck. These results suggest a late locus of the PRP bottleneck and 
stimulus repetition. 
Manipulating a response variable, Van Selst and Jolicoeur ( 1997) found additive effects 
with SOA in a PRP experiment. The proportion of Taskz go versus no/go trials was varied in 
this experiment so that, in one condition the proportion of go trials was 25% go and the 
proportion of no/go trials was 75%, and in another condition this relationship was revened. 
Subjects were only to respond on the go trials. RT2s were faster in the 75% go-trial condition 
than in the 25% go-trial condition, and this effect was additive with SOA. These results again 
support a late stage for the PRP bottleneck, and a locus of probability at, or beyond, this 
bottleneck. 
Luck (in press), using electro-physiological data, determined the locus of the PRP 
bottleneck to be at a stage of processing after identification and categorization of a stimulus. In 
this typical PRP paradigm, probability of the second stimulus was varied and response time 
recorded. In addition, event-related potential (ER.) waves, that measured the amount of tirne to 
perceive and categorize a stimulus, were recorded for the second stimulus. The analysis of 
reaction time revealed a PRP effect. Response time to the second stimulus increased as SOA 
decreased and this effect was modified by stimulus frequency which was additive with SOA. 
However, there was no change in the ERP waves. indicating that the PRP bottleneck, as well 
as the locus of probability, must be located at a stage of processing subsequent to identification 
and categorization, possibly at response selection. 
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Locus(i) of the AB Effect 
The evidence provided by these PRP studies is consistent with a late locus of the PRP 
bottleneck. Our research indicates that the locus of the AB effect is at, or after, the locus of this 
bottleneck. The suggestion of a late locus for the AB effect is in contrast to other theories that 
have attempted to provide an explmation for this interference effect. Most theories postulate an 
early locus for the effect, and certainly a locus separate from, and prior to, the locus of the PPR 
bottleneck. 
The Attentional Gate Model of Raymond et al. ( 1992) proposes that the AB effect is 
caused by a gating mechanism that occurs prior to pattern recognition. Shapiro et al. (1994), in 
their Similarity Theory, suggest that the AB effect takes place at a stage of processing where 
items compete for entry and report from VSTM. The Attentional DweII Model (Duncan, et al., 
1994; Ward, et al., 1996) proposes that the interference effect is an indirect result of an 
inability to rapidly deploy attenuon to items presented in rapid succession. Attention is required 
to create object representations so that further processing may proceed and the AB effect occurs 
because capacity to encode items into a form suitable for funher processing is limited. 
Likewise, the Two Stage Model (Chun & Potter, 1995) places the locus of the AB effect at a 
stage of processing that is required before representations cm be processed further, narnely the 
stage of short-tem consolidation. Thus, al1 these theories imply an early locus for the AB 
effect, certainly a locus before response selection. 
In conuast, the Central Interference Theory provides a theoretical frarnework for the 
AB effect that postulates a late locus of interference, possibly at response selection when Taski 
is speeded, and at short-term consolidation when Taski is not speeded. The theory proposes 
that certain stages of processing require central mechanisms, which are capacity limited and 
therefore, cannot occur in parallel. If central processors are occupied by Taski, processing of 
Task2 must be delayed. The Centrai Interference theory also proposes that more than one stage 
of processing is central, and that different stages are implicated in delaying Task2, depending 
on whether the response to Tl is speeded or unspeeded. When Taski is speeded, the stage of 
response selection delays short-tem consolidation of Tz, and when Taski is unspeeded. short- 
term consolidation of Tl  delays short-term consolidation of T2. 
Evidence supporting the theory that different stages of processing contribute to this 
interference effect is provided by the finding the magnitude of the AB effect increased as the 
number of response alternatives increased when Taski was speeded but not when it was 
unspeeded (Jolicoeur, 1999b). Also, the size of the AB effect has been found to be larger at the 
shorter Tl-Tl lags when Task~ is speeded than when it is unspeeded, but has the opposite 
effect at the later T 1 -T 1 lags (Jolicoeur, 1999a). Together. these results suggest that different 
processes are at work when the response to Ti is speeded and is made on-line, compared to 
when it is delayed. 
RTI, Task2 accuracy, and the Central Interfierence 7heow 
Moreover. the Centrai Interference Theory of the AB effect is supported by the research 
presented in this thesis. The results from the AB experiment in which Taski was speeded 
(Exp. 1) can be used to test a prediction of the theory. According to the Central Interference 
Theory. the AB effect is caused by a delay in processing T2 because central mechanisms are 
occupied by Taski. The duration of the delay is related to the length of time central mechanisms 
are occupied. and the effect of this delay is reflected in Task? performance. When Taskl is 
speeded, the stage responsible for the delay of Task2 processing is believed to be response 
selection. Thus, according to the Central Interference Theory, a correlation between RTi and 
Task2 performance should be evident when Taski is speeded Long RTls should be associated 
with poorer performance on Taskz, and a large AB effect, and short RTls should correlate with 
better performance on Taski, and a smaller AB effect. The results from Expenment 1 support 
this prediction. A correlation was observed between RTI and the size of the AB effect in that 
long RTls produced a larger AB effect than short RTls. This pattern was evident on a trial by 
trial basis and it was determined not to be a result of a general change in the pattern of 
performance as the experiment progressed. 
An Alfernate Accounf of Drral- Task Integerence Effects 
Although a response selection processing bottleneck is the most prevalent account of 
dual-task interference effects, another account of the fundamental mechanism underlying dual- 
task interference has ken  proposed relatively recently by Meyer and Kieras ( 1997a) in their 
computational theory of concurrent performance on cognitive tasks. The theory. Executive- 
Process Interactive Control (EPIC). posits that bottleneck-like effects, as found in dual-task 
experiments, are not induced by a stmcturally permanent central bottleneck, but rather, are a 
consequence of flexible strategies employed by individuals in order that they conform to the 
experimental instructions used in PRP studies. In PRP experiments subjects are instructed to 
respond to a primary stimulus pnor to responding to a second stimulus. For example, in the 
PRP experirnents reported here, subjecü were to make their response to the first stimulus, the 
tone, pnor to making their response to the letter. According to Meyer and Kieras (1997a), the 
PRP effects observed in these experiments are a result of defemng the production of a 
response to the letter rather than an inability to select responses for two tasks simultaneously. 
This response deferment strategy is flexible, implemented on a temporary basis, and does not 
resemble the permanent central bottleneck proposed by the postponement account of duai-task 
interference (McCann & Johnson, 1992, Pashler, 1989). The theoretical exphnation of dual- 
task interference provided by EPIC is based on the application of production rules that speciS, 
that motor execution of the response associated with the first task must have progressed 
sufficiently before production of the response for the second task can ensue. 
This computationai theory (Meyen & Kieras, 1997a) is built on a production-system, 
called the Panimonious Production System (PPS), made up of production rules and a 
production mle interpreter. The production niles and interpreter are contained within procedural 
memory. Actions are executed whenever the contents of woiking memory (i.e. syrnbolic 
information. such as goals. steps and notes used to test and apply the procedural d e s ) ,  and the 
conditions of a production rule are satisfied. The PPS allows for parallel processing in that 
several production rules can be assessed by the interpreter at one time, and actions can be 
executed together as long as they do not conflict with each other. In essence. processing 
necessary for more than one task can occur in parallel. 
Stimulus input is received as sensory information by visual, auditory. and tactile 
perceptual processors which, in tum. send output to working memory indicating that the 
stimulus has been detected and providing feature information such as colour, size, loudness, 
etc.. From the contents of working memory, and the operation of the PPS production rule 
interpreter, a cognitive processor selects symbolic information about the response (e.g., left 
hand - index finger) and sends relevant information to vocal and/or manual rnotor processon. 
The motor processors prepare and execute responses. There is also an ocular motor processor 
which determines what information to send to the visual perceptual processor depending on the 
spatial position of the eyes. The preparation of movement features by the motor processors 
occun prior to the initiation and execution of the response movement. Movement features are 
those characteristics of the response that are specific to the response modality, such as the hand 
and finger that are needed to make a response. The preparation of movement is a process bat 
transforms the symbolic representation of a response to an output cornmand that controls 
effectors. Features are processed serially and the time from onset of preparation to the start of 
an oven response depends on the number of response features that need to be considered 
dunng the transformation process. Thus. the number of response alternatives will affect the 
time to prepare a response. According to the theory. each hand is not controlled by a separate 
motor processor. The manual motor processor takes care of movement production for both 
hands and, consequentiy, interference can occur when more than one response needs to be 
made, either with different hands, or with the same hand. 
Although the cognitive processor has unlirnited capacity and can handle several sets of 
production rules in parallel, the processes performed by the production rules must be 
coordinated. When there is more than one task, processes necessary to perfom the tasks can 
occur simultaneously but in order to ensure that the tasks are performed properly, and in the 
correct order, an executive controller is needed. In addition, the controller must monitor 
progress on each task, update working memory, and ensure that there is no attempt to use the 
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same effectors at the same time. Supervisory control is achieved by executive processes that 
use production niles separate from those associated with individual tasks. 
To explain performance for the PRP procedure Meyer and Kieras ( 1997a) provide a 
specific model called the Strategic Response-Deferment Model (SRD). In this model there is no 
'wait' period for response selection of Task~ because the cognitive processor cm test and apply 
production mles to more than one task in parallel. Response to Taskl occurs irnmediately 
because participants in a PRP experiment are instructed that their primary response is to the 
first stimulus (Le. Taskl). However. at shon S0.4 a strategic deferment of the Task2 response 
is applied in which the response for Task2 is stored temporarily in working mernory in order 
that the response order of the PRP paradigm cm be adhered to (i.e. Task 1 response before 
Taskz response). Response deferment is controlled by an executive process. After sufficient 
progress on the Taski response has occurred the response for Taskz is released from working 
memory and sent to the motor processor for output. 
In PRP experiments subjects are inswcted to make their response to both stimuli as 
quickly as possible, and to make the Taski response pnor to the Task2 response. Meyer and 
Kieras (1 997) propose that the capacity for cognitive processing is unlimited and that 
interference observed in these experiments is not caused by a permanent processing bottleneck 
at response selection (or anywhere else for that matter). Insted. it is due to the application of a 
flexible strategy that allows for the Taskz response to be deferred. This strategy is adopted 
when processing of Taski and Task2 occur in parailel so that a response to the first stimulus 
can be made before a response to the second stimulus. In addition, the deferred strategy 
ensures that there is no conflict over use of the motor processor. 
Although central processes like stimulus identification. response selection, and 
movement production can temporaily overlap, peripheral processes that are associated with the 
manual, vocal. and occular motor processors, are capacity limited. For example, at the level of 
stimulus input, the eyes cannot be directed toward two stimuli simultaneously, and, at response 
output. the hands cannot make responses to more than one stimulus at a time. Central 
processors allocate penpheral resources efficiently so that there is no attempt to use them 
concurrently for different tasks which might result in confusion and attenuate performance. 
What are the implications of the EPIC theory for the AB interference effect? The 
motivation behind using flexible strategies and executive processes is based on the necessity to 
respond to one task prior to another under conditions where, if the mechanism allowed, the 
Taskz response could occur before the Taski response. or. the response for both tasks could 
occur simultaneously. If this is tme, one would expect to find no evidence of interference when 
the strategy is not implemented, as when one, or both tasks do not require a speeded response. 
Under these conditions, when a response is not speeded, there is no pressure to assure that the 
Taski response is made before the Task2 response. Therefore, there should be no need to 
employ a strategy that defen the Task2 response and. furthemore. there should be no 
interference effect. In the AB experiments reponed here (Exps. 1-2), the response to Task2 is 
always unspeeded and subjects are free to take as much time as they wish to make their 
response at the end of the trial. In the second of the AB experiments (Exp. 2), both responses 
are unspeeded. Yet, in both experiments, where one would expect no need of defemng the 
Taskz response, and thus no e ffect, interference effects are clearl y apparent. 
Rather than relying on the use of flexible strategies that result in defemng the Task2 
response, the EPIC theory posits that evidence of bottleneck-like effects in the PRP literature 
can sometimes be accounted for by taking into account capacity limitations on peripheral 
processing that occurs prior to, or after, central processing. For example. Meyer and Kieras 
( 1997b) account for the additive effects of varying stimulus compatibility, found by McCann 
and Johnston ( 1 W2), by considering the influence of the capacity-limited occular motor 
processor. Taskl in the study conducted by McCann and Johnston (Exp. 1, 1992), was a tone 
discrimination task to which subjects made a vocal response. Task2 was a visual shape 
discrimination task that required a manual response. Stimulus compatibility was varied so that 
on some trials subjects used a highiy compatible stimulus-response (S-R) mapping to make 
their response, while on other trials the S-R mapping was not compatible. The selection of a 
response is believed to be more dificult when S-R compatibility is low, thus affecthg the 
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response selection stage of processing. In this snidy. a diagrarn was provided just below the 
computer screen to aid subjects in remembering the correct mapping. Meyer and Kieras 
( 1997b) believe that the additive effects observed in this experiment are not caused by a 
structural processing bottleneck at response selection but are due to the effect of long occular 
orientation time - that is. the time taken to redirect the eyes from the S-R mapping diagrarn to 
fixation of the Task2 stimulus location after the start of the trial. In order to remember the 
incompatible S-R mapping, subjects would presumably check the diagram frequently during 
the course of the experiment. Therefore, they may have ken  relatively slow in redirecting their 
eyes to the Task;! stimulus location at the beginning of a trial. According to the EPIC theory, it 
is this long occular movement time that is reflected in additivity of RT2 with SOAs, not a 
consistent 'wait' period during which Task2 processing is delayed until Taski processing is 
completed, which is the account provided by the postponement theory of dual-task 
in terference. 
However. if this account is correct, it is not clear why the effect of S-R compatibility is 
not underadditive with decreasing SOA, since the locus of the effect is at an early stage of 
processing. prior to a stage at which a response might be deferred, i.e. the PRP bottleneck. 
If an early peripherai limitation were applied to the processes involved in the AB efiect 
it might take the form of interference in a translation process that occurs prior to response 
selection. Such a process might consist of mslating Tl and T2 from visual representations to 
some other form of representation. This process would require verbalizing the stimulus, but, 
due to the limited capacity of the articulatory motor processor, verbalizing one stimulus cannot 
occur while verbalizing another stimulus. Thus. in the AB experiments (Expenments 1 & 2), it 
would not be possible to 'say' the letter 'H' (a Taski stimulus) while 'saying' the letter 'Y' (a 
Taskz stimulus). The outcome of this interference, which occurs at an early stage of processing 
prior to the unlimited capacity of central processing, would be observed as the AB effect. 
If this account of interference is correct, one would expect the sarne explanation to 
apply to the PRP effect. The AB experiments are sirnilar to the PRP experiments in that stimuli 
are presented in close succession to each other. In addition, the response to Tl, at least in one 
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of the AB expenments. is speeded. Speeded responses are also required in the PRP 
experiments. If a process of translation is applied to stimuli in one experimental paradigm there 
appears to be no reason to assume that the same process would not be applied to stimuli used in 
the other paradigm. Either, Ti and T2 in the AB experiments undergo a process of translation 
and a similar process is appiied to S 1 and Sz in the PRP expenments. or, stimuli are not 
subjected to this translation process, in which case there should be no evidence of interference 
in either the AB or PRP experiments. It could be argued that the AB and PRP experiments 
reported here are not the sarne because in the former, Tl and Tz were presented in the sarne 
modality (visual) whereas in the latter. Si and S2 were presented in different modalities 
(auditory/visual). Consequently, they may show differential effects of perceptual interference. 
However, Jolicoeur ( l999c), showed similar AB effects to those found here, in a study where 
Ti was a tone and T2 a visual letter. Taking in to account the sirnilarities between the AB and 
PRP experiments, and the comparative AB effects found in uni-modal and cross-modal 
designs, it seems safe to assume that, if the process of translation takes place, it is common to 
ail target stimuli despite the modality of Ti and T2, and regardless of whether the experimental 
paradigm is one designed to exhibit an AB effect or a PRP effect. 
In the PRP expenments (Experimenü 3 & 4) the first task was a tone discrimination 
task and the second task a letter discrimination rask. Thus. according to the EPIC theory, 
interference would occur because it would be impossible to 'say' the tone presented (e.g., 
'high') while 'saying' the Ietter (e.g., 'H'). As was the case with the McCann and Johnston 
( 1992) results. problematic to the interpretation of an eiuly locus of interference provided by 
the EPIC theory is the observation of additive effects with SOA in the PRP experiments. 
According to an early peripheral capacity limitation account of interference we should have 
found underadditive effects with decreasing SOA in the PRP experiments because the 
interference effect is occumng early on in processing, prior to the PRP bottieneck. There was 
no hint of an interaction of probability with SOA in these experiments. Thus, the capacity 
limitation of early peripheral processing proposed by the EPIC theory is not supported by the 
results observed in these PRP or AB experiments. 
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Another possibility exists with respect to peripheral interference. The EPIC theory 
rnight propose that the AB effect is a consequence of interference late in processing, where a 
response is translated to a motor code. a code that consisü of manual motor features (e.g., 
button-press). In the experiments rsponed here. the response moddity was the same for each 
task. namely manual button-press. Consequently. the potential exists for interference in 
determining the features of responses, i.e. press a key. Supposedly, one cannot produce the 
appropriate 'press a button' code for one response while concurrently producing a similar code 
for another response. This account of dual-task interference is unlikely to be correct, however, 
because the nature of Task2 in the AB experimenü, eliminates the need for concurrent 
processing at this level of response output. As already discussed, the response to Taskz in the 
AB experiments is always delayed until the end of a trial. and in Experiment 2. Taski is also 
delayed. Therefore. there should be no conflict in the process of translating response 
information to a motor code. as the processing necessary for each task can occur 
independentl y. 
The issue of both early and late peripheral interference is addressed by the following 
results, demonstrated by Jolicoeur (Exp. 5, 1998d). With respect to an early locus of 
peripheral interference in which stimulus information cannot be transformed to articulatory 
codes in parallel. the stimuli in this study had no names and were therefore not easily codable 
in a verbal format. As far as the Iate locus of interference, i.e. translation into motor codes, the 
motor code for one of the responses in this experiment could not be determined until the end of 
the trial because the stimulus information was not provided until that time. Hence, the 
translation process for Taskz was not postponed by the same process for Taski. 
The first task in this study was a speeded four-alternative discrimination response to an 
auditory tone. A randorn polygon was presented at variable SOA after the tone and was 
followed by a pattern mask. At the end of each trial, after the response to the tone, two 
perturbed polygons were presented. One was an exact match to the fust polygon, the other was 
randomly perturbed. The second üisk was to identify which of these polygons matched the 
polygon initially presented by selecting the polygon that matched (a left / right response). Both 
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responses were made using the keyboard. The response to the tone was speeded but the 
response to the polygon was not speeded. 
The results showed that identifying the polygon became more dificult as SOA 
decreased. Both the early and late accounts of peripheral interference supplied by the EPIC 
theory are difficult to appiy as sources of interference in this experiment. Fint. random 
polygons were used as stimuli and were not easily namable, thereby providing no means of 
translating stimulus information into an articulatory code. In addition, the position of the 
polygons shown at the end of the trial could not be detected in advance. so the motor response 
could not be computed until the polygon appeared at the end of the trial. The design of this 
study, and the forthcorning results, do not support the hypothesis of an early peripheral locus 
of dual-task interference. Likewise, a late account of interference is not supported because the 
information regarding the response for Task2 was not provided until the response to Taski was 
complete. Consequently, the condition necessary to produce interference in transforming 
information to a motor response code did not exist. 
Al1 in all, the results from the AB and PRP expenments reponed in this thesis do not 
appear to be well accounted for by the EPIC theory of multiple task performance (Meyer & 
Kieras, 1997a; 1997b). In fact, some of the evidence provided by these results provides 
potential problems for the theory as it cuirently stands. 
Locus(i) of Sigcal Probabiliry 
Stimulus probability has not previously been used in experiments designed to exhibit 
AB effects. In this thesis this variable is used in a novel way to modulate the sire of the AB. as 
well as show effects in PRP experiments. The interpretation of the effects of stimulus 
probability found in the experiments reported here in relationship to the locus(i) of AB and 
PRP effects provides a contribution to Our knowledge of the nature of signal probability. 
The locus(i) of stimulus probability has not k e n  clearly determined. Miller and 
Hardzinski (198 1) propose that the eflect of stimulus probability is to facilitate the transmission 
of feature information extracted from the physical representation of a stimulus to the name, or 
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abstract code, associated with that stimulus. They daim it is neiiher the sole process of 
extracting the stimulus information nor activation of the name code, per se. that is affected by 
probability, but rather, the activation of the specific route between stimulus feaiure information 
and the appropriate stimulus code. Routes that are more likely to be activated, because of high 
probability, develop a lower threshold of activation. Hence. a specific route that is highly 
probable cm be activated more quickly than a route that is less probable. 
If, as the data suggests. the effect of stimulus probability is occumng at, or after, the 
PRP bottleneck, the possibility exists that probability and the PRP bottleneck share the sarne 
locus, namely the stage of processing at which an abstract code is activated. It is possible that 
feature extraction and name code generation are substages of encoding. The activation of an 
abstract code rnay be the final process in encoding, immediately preceding response selection. 
Altematively the stage at which a name or abstract code is generated might constitute an initiai 
substage of response selection. If we infer that the loci of probability and the PRP bottleneck 
are common, and that code generation is an initial substage of response selection, this would 
certainly be in accordance with the findings from the PRP literature proposing the existence of 
a PRP bottleneck at response selection (McCann & Johnston. 1992; Pashler, 1994; Van Selst 
& JoIicoeur, 1997). 
The modulating effect of stimulus probability on the AB effect provides evidence that 
the locus of the probability effect is at, or before, the locus of the AB effect. Thus, both these 
effects could share a common locus. It is not inconceivable to suggest that stimulus probability, 
the PRP bottleneck, and at least sorne of the AB effect (there rnay be more than one locus), al1 
share a common locus and that this locus is at a stage of processing at which a name or abstract 
code for a stimulus is activated. 
Locus(i) of Repetiîion Eflects 
In addition to the effects found with stimulus probability, stimulus repetition, another 
variable manipulated within the experimentai design, was investigated. Trials on which the 
target stimulus (Ti in the AB m.d S:! in the PRP experiments) was not the same as the target 
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stimulus presented on the immediately preceding trial were compared to trials on which the 
stimulus was the same. Stimulus repetition modulated the size of the AB effect. Repeating a 
target stimulus produced a smdler AB effect than presenting a different target stimulus. In the 
PRP experiments, repeating a target stimulus produced faster responses than a different target, 
and the effect of stimulus repetition was additive with SOA (as also found by Pashler & 
Johnston, 1989). 
The finding that stimuli that were repeated on an immediately preceding trial were 
responded to faster and more accurately than stimuli that were not repetitions is not unusual. 
This effect was first reported by Hyman ( 1953) and subsequently termed the repetition effect 
by Bertelson ( 196 1 ). The task of determining the locus of the repetition effect yields the same 
problem encountered when investigating the locus of signal probability. that king that stimulus 
repetition is confounded by response repetition. Early research attempted to distinguish a 
perceptual locus from a response locus by mapping several stimuli on to one response, or one 
stimulus to more than one response. In this way, as with signal probability, the effects of 
repeating the stimulus or the response could be evaluated independently. If sarne-response 
trials showed a repetition advantage it was generally assumed that the effect was occumng at 
the level of the response, either response selection or execution, whereas if the RT advantage 
was observed only when the stimulus was repeated, the effect was assumed to be occuning at 
a perceptual level. 
Similar to the early research in signal probability, initial studies investigating the 
repetition effect did not yield consistent results. Bertelson (1965) coupled two even numbered 
digits (2 and 4) with one response and two odd digits (5 and 7) with another response and 
found difierent stimulus/same-response trials to be faster than different-stimulus/different- 
response trials and only slightly slower than trials on which both the stimulus and the response 
had been repeated. In contrast, Smith (1968) found a greater effect of repetition on different- 
stirnulus/different-response triais compared to trials on which the stimulus was different but the 
response was the sarne. In this study. stimulus characteristics of colour and digit were varied 
and subjects were instructed to press one response key if they saw a Red 1 or a Green 2 and to 
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use another response key if they saw a Green 1 or a Red 2. Response times were fastest when 
the stimulus and the response were the sarne as those on the immediately preceding trial. 
whereas trials on which only the response was repeated (different stimulus/same response) 
were slowest. Intermediate were those trials on which neither the stimulus nor the response 
were the sarne. 
The results from these studies are contradictory with respect to the locus of the 
repetition effect. Bertelson's work implies that the response is the determinant of the repetition 
effect because the greatest difference in the size of the effect lay benveen the different 
stimuluslsame response and different stimulusldifferent response conditions. Thus, in this 
study the effect of repetition appeared to be a function of repeating the response rather than 
repeating the stimulus. On the other hand, Smith ( 1968) provided evidence against the 
response as the sole determinant of the eRect. and her results point instead to the significance 
of the stimulus-response pairing. Responses were faster on trials where both stimulus and 
response were repeated than on trials on which the response was repeated but the stimulus was 
different. Thus, repeating a response in this study had little effect compared to repeating a 
stimulus and a response. 
Earlier work by Bertelson (1963) aiso suggested that the response component in these 
types of tasks is a major contributor to the repetition effect. Using a 1 : 1 S-R rnapping, 
Bertelson found an interaction of S-R compatibility with repetition, thereby implicating 
response selection as a locus of the repetition effect. The effect of decreasing S-R compatibility 
was greater on non-repeated trials than on repeated triais. As S-R compatibility increased, the 
difference between repeated and non-repeated trials increased. Additionai evidence in favour of 
a late locus for the effect of repetition cornes from an absence of interactive effects found 
between repetition and stimulus intensity (Hansen & Well, 1984; Pashler & Johnston, 1989). 
These results are consistent with a locus of stimulus repetition occumng at a stage of 
processing that is after the stage affected by stimulus intensity, but at, or before, the stage at 
which S-R compatibility has its effect Pashler and Johnston (1989) examined the effects of 
stimulus intensity and repetition of S2 in a PRP experiment and found additive effects of 
90 
stimulus repetition and SOA. Taski wac a two-alternative discrimination response to an 
auditory tone (lowhigh). Task2 was a three-alternative discrimination response to one of three 
letters (A, B. or C). Stimulus intensity war found to be underadditive with decreasing SOA, 
while stimulus repetition was additive. According to the locus of cognitive slack logic (McCann 
& Johnston, 19%; Pashler, 1984; Pashler & Johnston, I989), the effect of stimulus repetition 
in this experiment was occumng at. or after. the locus of the PRP effect. These results are 
again consistent with a locus of stimulus repetition at response selection. 
Pashler and Baylis (199 1) demonstnted the repetition effect in several experiments j y  
showing that same stimuluslsame response trials produced significantly faster responses than 
different stirnulusldifferent response trials. They also observed a moderate benefit on different 
stimulus/same response trials when stimuli that shared the same response were memben of a 
common conceptuai category ( e g ,  letters or digits), compared to when they were not easily 
categorizable. For example, when the stimuli 4 and P were coupled with response 1, and 
stimuli 2 and V with response 2, trials on which the response was the sarne, but the stimulus 
was different, were responded to more slowly than trials on which both stimulus and response 
were different, or stimulus and response were the same. Thus, there was no benefit to 
repeating the response but not the stimulus. When the digits 2 and 4 were coupled with 
response 1. and the leners P and V with response 2. a small benefit of different stimulus/same 
response trials over different stimulusldifferent response trials was found. In the latter 
experiment, the stimuli associated with each individual response could easily be classified as 
members of a conceptual category (i.e., digits or lettefi), whereas in the former experiment this 
task would have been much more dificult (4 and Pl2 and V). Pashler and Baylis concluded 
from these experiments (Exps. 1 - 3, 199 1) that the effect of repetition is stimulus specific but 
rhe degree to which stimuli can be grouped into categories, such as digits versus letters, affects 
the size of the repetition effect when a response, but not a stimulus. is repeated. The effect of 
repeating the response, in their experiment, was seen as a decrease in response time, and 
appeared to be a function of the ability to classi@ same-response stimuli into membea of a 
common group. 
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Although they found that categorization produced a moderate effect of response 
repetition. Pashler and Baylis (1991) noted that the greatest benefit to repeating a response was 
observed when stimuli were varied on an attnbute that was not only incidentai to perfonning 
the task, but was also perceptually separable from the task-relevant factor. When letters of the 
sarne name but different case (e-g.. G and g) were coupled with one response, only a modest 
effect of repeating the response was noted (Exp. 4, 199 1). These results again suggest that the 
repetition effect is highly stimulus specific because little benefit to repeating a response was 
found, even though the stimulus was varied on an attribute that was not relevant to performing 
the task (i.e., case). However, when leners were identical in name and case, and were varied 
on the basis of colour (e.g., Red G and Green G = response 1 ; Red A and Green A = 
response2). a large effect of repeating the response was observed (Exp. 5. 199 1 ). In this 
experiment, as in the previous one, stimuli coupled to the same response were varied dong an 
attribute that was irrelevant to performing the task. The additional factor in this experiment was 
that the stimulus variation was perceptually separable from the dimensions of the stimulus that 
were needed to perform the task (i.e., same narneldifferent colour) (Pashler & Baylis, 1991). 
The majority of work investigating the effects of stimulus repetition, particularly the 
more recent research, appears to be consistent with the theory of a locus at a late stage of 
processing awxiated with the response to the stimulus, rather than early perceptual processing 
of the stimulus itself (Hansen & Wells, 1984; Pashler & Johnston, 1989). However, the 
results reported by Pashler and Baylis (1991) suggest that the repetition effect is stimulus 
specific. This observation links the effect of repetition to the perceptual characteristics of the 
stimulus and stimulus identification, which in turn suggests an early locus for the effect. 
Further work by Pashler and Baylis (Exp. 6, 1991) showed that the effect of repetition 
disappeared under conditions where a stimulus was paired with more than one mode of 
response. In this expriment there were two response conditions, manual and manual/vocal, 
coupled with each stimulus so that one stimulus was paired with more than one response. In 
the manual condition subjects pressed one key to respond to two stimuli (e.g., 4 and P = 
response 1; 2 and V = response 2; 8 and K = response 3), and in the manuaVvoca1 condition 
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they altemated between a manual response on odd numbered triais, and vocally naming the 
stimulus on even numbered trials. As expected, an effect of repetition was found in the manual 
condition. The question of interest was whether this effect would continue to occur when the 
stimulus was repeated, and a vocal response preceded a manual response in the manuaVvoca1 
condition. If the effect of repetition persisted across these altemating response modes, evidence 
would exist for a perceptual locus. if the effect disappeared, the iocus of the repetition effect 
could be determined to be at a response stage of processing. No effect of repetition was found 
in the manuaüvocal condition, rneaning that the effect of repetition did not transfer from one 
response mode to another, and thereby providing further evidence in suppon of a response 
selection locus. As well as king stimulus specific. the repetition effect appears to be fairly 
response specific (Pashler & Baylis , Exp. 7, 1991). Pashler and Baylis proposed that the 
effect is caused by an increase in the strength of a link that is generated between early formed 
representation of the stimulus and a specific response. This pathway is a response selection 
short-cut and it allows for the elimination of the process of selecting a response on trials on 
which the stimulus is repeated. 
Ells and Gotts (1977) aiso investigated the repetition effect under conditions where a 
stimulus was paired with more than one response. They found that stimulus repetition 
contributed more than response repetition in a simple task, but that response repetition was the 
greater contributor when the dificulty of the task was increased. In their first experiment 
subjects were assigned two target digits, and another digit was designated as a non-target. 
Digits could appear in any one of two locations (Ieft or right) and subjects were to respond to 
the location by moving a toggle switch in the direction of the location in which the digit had 
appeared. Subjects were only to respond as quickly as they could to targets, not non-targets. 
Non-targets remained on the screen for 1500 ms, at which time the next stimulus appeared. In 
this expenment there were four possible stimulus-response conditions - 1) same stimulus/ 
same response 2) same stimulus/different response 3) different stimulus/sarne response and 4) 
different stimulusldifferent response. Reaction tirnes were faster on same stimulusldifferent 
response trials, and sarne stimuIus/same response trials, than on different stimulus/same 
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response trials. Therefore, more effect of repetition was found when the stimulus was repeated 
compared to when the response. or neither the stimulus nor the response, were repeated. When 
the task was modified to be more difficult. by increasing the number of locations to three and 
increasing the tarpet set size to three, and the non-target set size to 5, it was found that response 
repetition was more of a conuibuting factor than stimulus repetition. In a third experiment, in 
which S-R pairings were incompatible, more contribution from repeating a stimulus than 
repeating a response was evident. Therefore, in Experiments 1 and 3 a facilitory effect of 
stimulus repetition was seen, whereas in Experiment 2 a greater contribution was made by 
repeating the response. The authon suggested that subjects rnay adopt different strategies that 
vary the weight of the stimulus and the response depending on the task ai hand. They also 
suggested that the effect of repeating a stimulus in this experiment was due to an decrease in the 
tirne to match a stimulus representation to items within a memory array when the stimulus was 
repeated. The effect of repeating a response was a facilitation of response selection processes. 
AI1 in dl, stimulus repetition is similar to signal probability in that the effect is not 
completely understood and the locus!i), has not been empirically determined. The data from the 
AB and PRP experiments reported here may shed some light on this issue. Stimulus repetition 
can be interpretedin a similar manner as the probability data. In speeded and unspeeded TI 
versions of the AB experiment, stimulus repetition affected the magnitude of the AB, indicating 
that the effect of this variable manipulation rnust be occumng at, or before, the locus of the AB 
effect. The additivity of stimulus repetition and SOA, exhibited in the PRP experiments, 
indicates that, in relation to the locus of the PRP bottleneck, the effect of stimulus repetition is 
either occumng at the same location as the bottleneck, or afier it. By combining the information 
from the AB and PRP experiments, regarding the locus of the repetition effect, it cm be funher 
established that the locus of the AB effect is occumng at, or after, the PRP bottleneck. 
Thus, we have two variables, stimulus probability and stimulus repetition, that have 
provided information to localize the AB effect in relation to the PRP bottleneck. What does this 
mean in terms of the processing stages implicated in performing the tasks conrained within an 
AB expenmental paradigm? What we know about the locus of the PRP bottleneck, as well as 
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the locus(i) of the effects of signal probability and stimulus repetition, will allow us to 
determine more precisely the stage at which the AB effect occurs. Evidence from the PRP 
literature strongly implies that the PRP bottleneck is ai. or before. the stage of response 
selection. The bottleneck is unlikely to be located at an early stage of processing because 
stimulus quality is typically seen as underadditive with decreasing SOA (De Jong, 1993; 
Pashler, 1984, Pashler & Johnston, 1989), meaning that the effect of stimulus quality occue 
pior to the bonleneck. Evidence also suggests that. although there rnay be multiple loci for the 
effect of signal probability, one locus is at a point in the processing sequence where a physical 
representation of a stimulus is transformed to an absuact code of some sort. The effect of 
stimulus probability is not seen when a name or absuact code does not need to be generated, 
such as in a task where stimuli are matched on the bais of physical identity (Pachella & Miller, 
Exp. 1, 1976). Additional information as to the locus of the probability effect cornes from the 
observation that stimulus quality and stimulus probability sometimes interact, indicating that 
these effects can share a cornrnon locus, perhaps at a final substage of encoding. However, the 
effects of stimulus quality and probability do not always interact (Miller, Exp. 3, 1979). The 
suggestion has been made that this interaction will oniy be evident when a narne or abstract 
code is activated and that, if these variables do not interact, no such process has occurred 
(Miller, 1979). This is likely me. In experiments where no interaction was found it was ofien 
conceivable that the use of a narne code would have k e n  of no benefit to performing the task 
(Miller, Exp. 3, 1979: Miller & Pachella, Exp. 2, 1976; Pachella & Miller, Exp. 2, !976). 
However, there are studies in which stimulus quality and probability do not interact and yet the 
use of a name code would seem to be relevant to performing the task. One example would be a 
task in which stimuli were to be judged the same if they possessed the same name but were of 
different case (Pachella & Miller, Exp. 1, 1976). In addition, the effects of probability continue 
to be evident, independent of interactive effects with stimulus quality. The evidence suggests 
that these variables, stimulus quality and stimulus probability. are sometirnes having their 
effects at different stages of processing, and implies more than one locus for the probability 
effect. Miller ( 1979) proposed that, when probability effects are additive with the effects of 
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stimulus quality. subjects have activated a pathway that, in essence. is a short-cut, visuo-motor 
connection, linking stimulus and response information. He suggested that this process occurs 
in the absence of name or abstract code ac~ivation. Adding to this view. one proposition might 
be that stimulus quality interacts with probability when a name code is used, but not when 
response information is also represented in the code. It is possible that stimulus as well as 
response information might be contained within a single code when an abstract code is 
generated for the soie purpose of perfonning an experimental task. The underadditive effects 
observed when stimulus quality alone is varied (Pashler & Johnston, 1989) indicate that the 
locus of this effect is early on in processing, likely at stimulus encoding. If signal probability 
and stimulus quality only interact when a narne code is generated, it may be that narne code 
generation, and activation, is at a final substage of encoding. immediately pnor to response 
selection, while activation of an abstract code, that rnay includes stimulus and response 
information, occun later in the series of processing stages. possibly at a substage of response 
selection. 
The empirical findings regarding the effects of signal probability suggest that there is 
more than one locus for the effects of this variable. Possibly the type of task, and the nature of 
the stimulus, determine the locus. Based on the research reponed here, the effects of stimulus 
probability appear to occur ai a final substage of encoding where a name code is generated, or 
at an early substage of response selection, or both. Research investigating the effects of 
stimulus repetition is cornplex but implicates one locus at the.stage of response selection. 
However, it may be that, aithough a greater effect is obtained by repeating a response than a 
stimulus, repeating a S-R code also produces an effect of repetition. 
Conclusion 
With respect to the locus of the A% effect we have already determined that this 
interference effect is occumng at, or after, the PRP bottieneck, and that the effects of stimulus 
probability and repetition take place at, or before, the AB locus. The possibility exists that the 
PRP bottleneck, the AB effect., and the effects of stimulus probability and stimulus repetition, 
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at least sometimes share the sarne locus. An altemate proposal is that the locus of the AB effect 
is at some late stage of processing, beyond the effect of stimulus probability and stimulus 
repetition. and the PRP bottleneck. 
Bear in rnind that the sequence of processing stages is likely not the sarne when Taski 
is speeded as when it is unspeeded. Consequently. the implications for a locus of the AB may 
not be the same under both Taski conditions. If we take into account the locus(i) of stimulus 
probability, stimulus repetition. and the PRP bottleneck, in relation to the locus of the AB, we 
are looking for a stage of processing that is at, or after, the effects of stimulus probability and 
stimulus repetition. and at. or after. response selection. the stage implicated as the locus of the 
PRP bottleneck. A likely candidate for the AB effect then. when Taski is speeded, is the stage 
of response selection. If. in the Taski speeded version of the AB paradigm, the locus of the 
AB effect is at response selection, it is unlikely that the same processing stage is implicated as 
the locus of interference when response selection is delayed until the end of a trial. It is 
possible that, under Taski unspeeded conditions, the AB effect is occurring ai the stage of 
short-tem consolidation. 
In summary, the research presented in this thesis contributes to Our knowledge of the 
nature of the dual-task interference effect known as the Attentional Blink. The effects of two 
variables. stimulus probability and stimulus repetition, were found ro be additive with SOA in 
PRP experiments indicating that these effects occurred at a stage of processing common to the 
PRP bottleneck, or beyond it. These sarne variables modulated the size of the AB effect, thus 
providing evidence that their Iocus(i) is at, or before, a locus of the AB effect. From these 
results, we can conclude that at least part of the AB effect is occumng at, or after, the PRP 
bottleneck. The most likely candidates are the stages of response selection, when Taskl is 
speeded, and short-term consolidation, when the response to Taski is delayed. In addition, the 
work presented here provides support for the Central Interference Theory by showing that, in 
the AB Taski speeded experiment, response times to Taski (i.e. shortnong) conelated with the 
size of the AB effect. 
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Figure Captions 
Fieure 1 .  Schematic representation of the effects of manipulating a Taskl variable that has a 
locus at. or after, the PRP bottleneck. The effect of varying the duntion of a stage of 
processing at, or before, the bottleneck will be reflected in mean Task2 response time. 
Figure 2. Hypothetical data representing the manipulation of a Task~ variable that displays 
additive effects with SOA. The difference between the levels of the Task2 variable manipulation 
is relatively equal across SOAs. 
Fimire 3. Schematic representation of the effects of manipulating a Taskz variable that has a 
locus before the PRP bottleneck. The effect of varying the duration of a stage of processing 
prior to the bottleneck will be absorbed in the period of cognitive slack, and will not be seen in 
mean Task2 response time. 
Figure 4. Hypothetical data representing the manipulation of a Taskz variable that displays 
underadditive effects with decreasing SOA. The difference between the levels of the Task2 
variable manipulation decreases as SOA decreases. 
Fimre 5.  Hypothetical data representing the manipulation of a Task2 variable that displays 
overadditive effects with decreasing SOA. The difference between the levels of the Task2 
variable manipulation increases as SOA decreases. 
Fipre 6. Experiment 1 - mean Task2 accuracy for Tl-present and Tl-absent trials, as a 
function of Tl-T2 lag. The effects of the probability (1 : 4: 9) of Tl as a function of Tl-T2 lag 
are shown. 
Fimre7. Experiment 1 - mean Task2 accuracy as a function of TpT2 lag, for Tppresent triais 
in the probability 9 condition, where Tl was not repeated, and Tl  was repeated. That is, triais 
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on which the TI letter was not the same as the Tl letter on the immediately preceding trial. and 
trials on which the Ti letter was the same as on the previous trial. 
Fimire 8. Experiment 1 - mean Task2 accuracy for Ti-present trials on which the Tl letter was 
not repeated. that is. was not the same as the Tl letter on the immediately preceding triai. The 
effects of the probability ( 1 : 4: 9) of Tl as a function of T 1-T2 lag are shown . 
Figure 9. Expenment 1 - mean Task2 accuracy depending on shon or long response times in 
Taski (based on a median split of Ti-present trials only) as a function of Ti-T2 lag. 
Fimire 10. Experiment 2 - mean Task2 accuracy for Ti -present and T !-absent trials, as a 
hinction of T I - T ~  lag. The effects of the probability ( 1  : 4: 9) as a function of Tl TpT2 lag are 
shown. 
Fimire 1 1. Experiment 2 - mean Task2 accuracy for TI -present trials in the probability 9 
condition as a function of Tl -T2 lag. where Tl was not repeated, and Tl was repeated. That is. 
trials on which the TI letter was not the same as the Ti letter on the immediately preceding trial, 
and trials on which the TI letter was the same as on the previous trial. 
Fimire 12. Experiment 2 - mean Task2 accuracy for Tl-present trials on which the Tl letter was 
not repeated, that is, was not the same as the Tl letter on the immediately preceding trial. The 
effects of the probability (1: 4: 9) of Tl as a function of TpT2 lag are shown . 
Fimire 13. E xperiment 3 - mean reaction time (ms) for Taski (dashed lines), and Task2 (solid 
lines). as a function of SOA. The effects of probability (1: 4: 9) of S2 as a function of SOA are 
shown. 
Figure - 14. Experiment 3 - mean Taskz reaction time (ms) for trials in the probability 9 
condition as a function of SOA, where S2 was not repeated, and where S2 was repeated. That 
is, trials on which the S2 letter was not the sarne as the S2 letter on the immediately preceding 
trial, and trials on which the S2 ietter was the same as on the previous trial. 
Fimire 15. Experiment 3 - mean Taskz reaction time (ms) for trials on which the S2 letter was 
not repeated, that is, was not the same as the Sz letter on the immediately preceding trial. The 
effects of probability (1 : 4: 9) as a function of SOA are shown. 
Fieure 16. Experiment 4 - mean reaction time (ms) for Taski (dashed lines), and Taskz S2- 
present trials (solid lines). as a function of SOA. The effects of probability (1: 4: 9) of S2 as a 
function of SOA are shown. 
Finure 17. Experiment 4 - mean Task2 reaction time (ms) for biais  in the probability 9 
condition as a function of SOA, where S2 was not repeated, and where S2 was repeated. That 
is, trials on which the S2 letter was not the same as the S2 letter on the imrnediately preceding 
trial, and trials on which the S2 letter was the same as on the previous trial. 
Fimire 18. Experiment 4 - mean Taskz reaction time (ms) for S2-present trials on which the S2 
letter was not repeated, that is, was not the same as the S2 letter on the imrnediately preceding 
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Appendix 4 
Experiment 1 - Mean Taski accuracy for each level of probability and Tl-T;! Iag 
Experiment 1 - Mean Taski response times (ms) for each level of probability and TpT2 lag 



































Experiment I - Mean Task2 accuracy for each level of probability and T I - T ~  lag 
Probability 
Level 
T 1 -T2 Lag 
Appendix C 
Expenment I - Mean Task2 accuracy on Tl -not repeated and Tl -repeated triais 

































Experiment 1 - Mean Task2 accuracy on Tl-not repeated trials 
for each level of probability and Tl-Tz Iag 
Tl -T2 Lag 
Appendix E 
Experiment 2 - Mean Taski accuracy nie for each level of probability and Tl-T? lag 
Probabili ty 
Level 
T 1 -Tl Lag 
Appendix F 
Experiment 2 - Mean Taskz accuracy for each level of probability and Ti-T2 lag 
Probability T 1 -T2 Lag 
Appendix G 
Expriment 2 - Mean Task;? accuracy for each Tl-T2 lag on Tl-not repeated 
and T 1 -repeated trials in the probability 9 condition 
Tl  -T2 Lag 
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Experiment 2 - Mean Taskz accuracy on TI-not repeated trials 
for each level of probability and T 1 - lag 

















































Experiment 3 - Mean Task 1 response times (ms) for each level of probabili ty and SOA (ms) 
Probability Level SOA (ms) 
Experiment 3 - Mean Taski error rates for each level of probability and SOA (ms) 
Probability Level SOA (ms) 
Appendix J 
Experiment 3 - Mean Taskî response times (ms) for each level of probability and SOA (ms) 
Probability Level SOA (ms) 
Experiment 3 - Mean Task2 error rates for each level of probability and SOA (rns) 
Probability Level SOA (ms) 
Appendix K 
Experiment 3 - Mean Taskz response times (ms) on S2-not repeated and Sz-repeated trials 


















Expriment 3 - Mean Task~ response times on Sz-not repeated trials 
for each level of probabiIity and SOA (ms) 
Probability Level SOA (ms) 
Appendix M 
Experiment 4 - Mean Taski response times (ms) for each level of probability and SOA (ms) 
Probability Level SOA (ms) 
Expenment 4 - Mean Taski error rates for each level of probability and SOA (rns) 
Robability Level SOA (ms) 
Appendix N 
Experiment 4 - Mean Task2 response times (ms) for each level of probability and SOA (ms) 
Robability Level SOA (ms) 
Experiment 4 - Mean Taskz error rates for each level of probability and SOA (ms) 
Robability Level SOA (ms) 
Appendix O 
Experiment 4 - Mean Taskz response times (ms) on S2-not repeated and S2-repeated trials 




















Experiment 4 - Mean Task2 rcsponse times on S2-not repeated trials 
for each level of probability and SOA (rns) 
Probability Level SOA (ms) 
